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CRIMINAL CLEAR STATEMENT RULES
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK* & JOSEPH E. KENNEDY**
ABSTRACT
There is a broad consensus in the criminal justice community that our
criminal statutes are a mess: They are imprecise, overly broad, and overly
punitive. Legislatures write these laws because there are significant
political incentives for them to be “tough on crime” and few incentives for
them to write carefully crafted laws. The problems of over-criminalization
thus seem to be both a predictable yet intractable consequence of the
incentives that legislatures face. But this Article offers a novel solution:
Judges should develop new clear statement rules to interpret criminal
statutes. The Supreme Court has created clear statement rules to protect
important values, such as federalism and the separation of powers.
Legislatures can overcome those values, but only if they do so affirmatively
and unambiguously. Just as existing clear statement rules protect important
structural values, new criminal clear statement rules would protect
important criminal justice values. Unless statutes clearly state that they
reject those values, clear statement rules will result in statutory
interpretations that better protect the interests of criminal defendants. The
result will be clearer and more thoughtful criminal laws—both because
legislatures will write better statutes and because judges will construe
poorly drafted statutes in a more narrow and predictable manner. In
addition to making the case for criminal clear statement rules as a general
interpretive tool, this Article proposes two specific clear statement rules.
One rule would create a default presumption of a knowing mental state
requirement for material elements. The other would impose a substantial
harm requirement. Both would markedly improve the state of modern
criminal law.
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INTRODUCTION
There is near-universal consensus in the legal community that our
criminal laws are a mess.1 Our laws are imprecise: they fail to define key
1.
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 27–52 (2001); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE
LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1–22 (2016); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75–110
(2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 244–81 (2011)
[hereinafter STUNTZ, COLLAPSE]; MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY
IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 3–20 (2004); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 41–68 (2003); Stuart P.
Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of
Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law
Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 992–96 (2019); Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 695, 702–09 (2017); Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J.
753, 785–804 (2002); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1339–48 (2008); Paul H. Robinson &
Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633,
635–44 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
569–78 (2001) [hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological]. But cf. Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy
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terms, and they regularly omit key information, such as what mental state is
required to trigger the law. Our laws are overly broad: they include conduct
that seems only marginally related to the problem the legislature claimed to
have been addressing, and they include seemingly trivial or harmless
behavior in their sweeping terms. Our laws are also overly punitive: they
routinely contain harsh sentences that are designed to pressure defendants
into pleading guilty rather than to delineate appropriate levels of
punishment. As a result, the United States has the highest incarceration rate
in the Western world.2
These criminal laws are the product of legislative dysfunction. Crime is
exploited for political gain. As others have noted, criminal legislation
essentially serves as campaign literature for legislators.3 Legislatures
package unrelated crimes with a similar feature as a “new crime problem”
and refer to those committing the crimes in sensationalized terms, like
“superpredators.”4 Legislators rarely mention the fact that the behavior they
are purporting to address is already criminal and subject to significant
punishment. What is more, there is no organized lobby against criminal
legislation.5 As a result, there is little debate or pushback on imprecise,
overly broad, or overly punitive criminal laws. Instead, legislators line up
to pass new criminal laws without any shared understanding of what they
mean, how far they sweep, and how they fit into the existing criminal laws.
Because of this legislative dysfunction, the meaning of criminal statutes
often must be resolved in the context of specific cases. In the case of
imprecise laws, judges are left to determine what that language actually
means. And in the case of overly broad laws, no one expects the laws to be
enforced as written. Instead, we rely on prosecutors to use their discretion
to weed out cases involving only trivial behavior.6 But if a prosecutor
and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1–8) (noting that
public attitudes towards the criminal justice system are in flux and, as a result, criminal justice reform
has been adopted in several jurisdictions), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=339180
0.
2.
Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1713
(2006).
3.
Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 774 (1999).
4.
Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 870–73 (2000).
5.
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1029–30 (2006).
6.
DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 368–69 (2010);
see also William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law,
in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 378 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (“The real law, the ‘rules’ that
determine who goes to prison and for how long, is not written in code books or case reports. Prosecutors
. . . define it by the decisions they make when ordering off the menus their states’ legislatures have given
them.”).
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exercises her sweeping discretion under these laws in a way that is not
politically popular, legislators can claim that the result was not what they
intended.7 And when courts step in to make the hard choices the legislators
failed to make, the same legislators often complain that judges are
overstepping their bounds.8 This is a win-win for legislators. They get to
criticize others for doing the job that they themselves refused to do in the
first place. Nice work if you can get it.
Prosecutors and judges bear some of the blame in this dysfunctional
relationship. In some instances, prosecutors are the reason for poorly drafted
and overlapping statutes. Prosecutors routinely lobby for new, sweeping
legislation, even when existing laws would address perceived wrongdoing.9
And when efforts have been made to reform criminal codes, prosecutors
have often stood in the way of that reform.10
Judges also enable this state of affairs. Courts fail to set clear and
consistent rules about how legislatures should speak to them. Many judges
say that they will interpret statutes based only on their text, while others say
they will interpret laws in conformity with the legislature’s purpose for
enacting them. Under the textualist approach, courts base their interpretive
decisions on what they believe an ordinary speaker of English would
understand the text to say. But it is extremely difficult to predict what judges
will conclude is the ordinary meaning of a statute. Purposivist approaches
do not fare much better. While legislatures clearly intend to extend the scope
7.
See, e.g., Matt Bokor, Prosecutors Have Little Sympathy for Senior Gamblers, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 4, 1982, LEXIS (reporting that upon learning that prosecutors filed illegal gambling charges
against eight seniors who were playing a “nickel-and-dime card game,” House Criminal Justice
Chairman Larry Smith, “while not advocating a change in the statute, said he would hope prosecutors
would use better judgment”); Michael E. Miller, N.C. Just Prosecuted a Teenage Couple for Making
Child Porn—of Themselves, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mor
ning-mix/wp/2015/09/21/n-c-just-prosecuted-a-teenage-couple-for-making-child-porn-of-themselves
[https://perma.cc/6XMS-B59Y] (noting that the legislator “who wrote the law . . . said he never intended
for it to be used against kids in a consensual relationship” even though the text of the statute did not
include any such limitations); Brendan Sasso & Jennifer Martinez, Lawmakers Slam DOJ Prosecution
of Swartz as ‘Ridiculous, Absurd,’ HILL (Jan. 15, 2013, 10:52 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology
/277353-lawmakers-blast-trumped-up-doj-prosecution-of-internet-activist [https://perma.cc/A8BU-2R
Z9] (reporting that, when charges filed by prosecutors under the notoriously imprecise Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act led to a defendant committing suicide, federal legislators criticized prosecutors’ decision
to bring charges).
8.
See, e.g., Okla. Lawmakers Move to Change Sodomy Law After Teen Suspect Cleared, FOX
NEWS (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/us/okla-lawmakers-move-to-change-sodomy-law-aft
er-teen-suspect-cleared [https://perma.cc/9M53-FVVB] (quoting state lawmaker who described courts’
decision not to read missing language into a criminal statute as a “grave error”).
9.
See, e.g., Josie Duffy Rice, Prosecutors Aren’t Just Enforcing the Law—They’re Making It,
APPEAL (Apr. 20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/prosecutors-arent-just-enforcing-the-law-they-re-making
-it-d83e6e59f97a/ [https://perma.cc/3X5M-DKLD].
10.
See Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice Reform,
NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-are-banding-together-to-preven
t-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/CW5U-SPN5].
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of existing criminal codes when they enact new criminal legislation, it is
difficult to determine precisely how far they intended to extend it. And so
judges routinely invent intent by imagining that legislators considered
grammar, punctuation, and statutory scheme as they carefully chose each
word11—a vision so at odds with the fast-paced sausage-making of criminal
legislating that it would be funny if it were not the source of such serious
problems.
Legislative dysfunction is, of course, not limited to criminal law.12 But it
has a number of particularly harmful effects in this area. It creates too much
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors effectively decide the scope of
imprecise or overbroad laws when charging and plea bargaining.13 Because
the laws are often also overly punitive, prosecutors have significant leverage
to secure pleas. Given the drastic potential consequences they face,
defendants cannot risk the possibility of losing at trial, so they forgo the
opportunity to have a judge pass on the meaning of the statute in return for
a favorable plea bargain.14 The result is a system that routinely and
systematically deprives people of liberty without the safeguards that the
Constitution supposedly guarantees.
Imprecise and overly broad criminal laws also place the individual
members of the public in an impossible position. People must either risk
criminal liability when engaging in conduct that they reasonably believe
might be legal, or they must refrain from innocuous or even beneficial
behavior.15 And for laws that everyone breaks sometimes—such as traffic
laws—these overly broad laws are rarely enforced in an evenhanded
manner.16 Law enforcement is more likely to enforce these laws against

11.
E.g., United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on the placement
of a semi-colon in order to determine whether defendant was subject to a sentencing enhancement).
12.
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1–7 (1982)
(highlighting the difficulties in revising laws once they are passed and noting the problems associated
with that difficulty); Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative
Inaction, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435, 1441–50 (2014) (discussing the problems associated with legislative
gridlock).
13.
See Hessick, supra note 1, at 992–96.
14.
The rules of criminal procedure contribute to this dynamic, as they do not provide for the
same robust motions to dismiss as do the rules of civil procedure. In order to have a judge rule on the
scope of a statute, criminal defendants are forced to proceed to trial and move for a directed verdict—
but by that point a plea agreement is no longer a viable option. See James M. Burnham, Why Don’t
Courts Dismiss Indictments?, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 347, 348–51 (2015); James Fallows Tierney, Summary
Dismissals, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841, 1852–58 (2010).
15.
See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1152–56 (2016).
16.
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black”
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 278–88 (1999).
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people of color and in poor communities.17 Indeed, racial profiling is made
easier by the significant discretion that these laws give to police.18
The legislative dynamics that produce these criminal statutes also
diminish political accountability. Past accounts of statutory interpretation
have stressed dialogue between the legislature and the courts.19 But we
should also conceive of legislation as a dialogue between the legislature and
the public. Voters will evaluate their representatives based on the laws that
they pass (or fail to pass). But voters cannot hold legislators politically
accountable for statutes that voters cannot understand or whose meaning is
supposed to be determined by other actors—namely prosecutors (and
perhaps judges). In this sense, the failure to clearly define crimes denies
criminal defendants—and all voters—their day in the legislature.
This Article suggests a novel approach that may fundamentally change
these dynamics: criminal clear statement rules.20 A clear statement rule is a
particularly strong presumption that a judge uses when interpreting a statute
to protect certain values or interests. Specifically, clear statement rules
presume that the legislature did not intend the statute to undermine a value
or interest unless the legislature has affirmatively and clearly stated its intent
to do so. Clear statement rules protect the value or interest at issue by
requiring a particular outcome unless the statute contains explicit and
unambiguous language to the contrary.
Although courts have, on occasion, used clear statement rules in criminal
cases, existing clear statement rules are rarely relevant to the interpretation
of criminal laws. Existing clear statement rules vindicate non-criminal
17.
See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007)
(finding that people of African American and Hispanic descent were stopped more frequently than
whites during New York City’s stop-and-frisk initiative); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing:
Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 129, 143 (2000) (“In middle-class
areas, policing tends to be reactive (responses to residents’ calls), whereas poor neighborhoods
experience greater proactive policing (officers initiate contacts and engage in more obtrusive stops of
people on the streets).” (first citing W. Eugene Groves, Police in the Ghetto, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES
FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 103 (1968); and then citing
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE
(1967))).
18.
See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1511–38
(2007).
19.
See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (expressing an interest “that Congress
be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the
language it adopts”); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 210–18 (2013) (describing and documenting the “dialogic”
theory of statutory interpretation).
20.
As explained in more detail below, we are advocating for what some have called “superstrong clear statement rules,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 611–29 (1992), not
merely presumptions.
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values, such as federalism or separation of powers, and most criminal
statutes do not implicate those values. Our proposal expands the universe of
clear statement rules to vindicate values that are necessary to a fair and just
criminal justice system.21
Criminal clear statement rules have a number of benefits. They would
make it easier for citizens to understand the scope of what is being
prohibited. They would make it more likely that legislators actually
deliberate about the scope of the crime being created. And they would make
legislators more politically accountable for their decisions.
Clear statement rules would also make it more politically palatable for
judges to constrain legislatures. That is because clear statement rules do not
require judges to take sides between the individual rights of criminal
defendants and public safety. Rather, they require legislators to strike that
balance and to speak clearly and affirmatively about which balance they
struck. Absent such a clear statement, judges can legitimately say that the
legislature failed to criminalize certain conduct because the legislature did
not use the words required by the clear statement rule to make that choice
clear. In this way, the use of clear statement rules protects judges against
the politically loaded charge of judicial activism.
To be sure, clear statement rules are not content-neutral. They effectively
constitute default settings that privilege certain outcomes. This privileging
of outcomes entails substantive choices that require justification. We show
how this can be done by proposing two specific clear statement rules to be
applied in the absence of a clear statutory language to the contrary: (1) that
the mental state for all elements in a felony statute be knowing, and (2) that
a defendant must have intended or caused substantial harm in order to be
liable for a felony. These two clear statement rules provide a default setting
with a clear policy preference: they are specifically designed to act as a
bulwark against the pathological politics that have shaped criminal law to
become more punitive in recent decades.
We readily acknowledge that there are other potential criminal clear
statement rules that could be formulated and justified. Those other clear
21.
While criminal clear statement rules have been proposed before, previous proposals for the
use of criminal clear statement rules were significantly narrower in scope. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra
note 1, at 862 (“In cases where defendants are likely to face mandatory imprisonment at sentencing, the
use of the term willfully in a federal criminal statute shall require the government to prove that the
defendant knew he was violating a legal duty when performing the acts described by the offense. In
cases where defendants are likely to face mandatory imprisonment at sentencing, the use of the term
knowingly shall require the government to prove that the defendant had knowledge with respect to all
factual elements of the offense charged.”); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of
Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1053 (1999) (“The
Court will interpret a statute to require the government to prove moral blameworthiness if the Court can
imagine an extreme hypothetical in which the government’s interpretation would reach action that is not
culpable according to an unwritten moral code.”).
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statement rules need not be as provocative or as sweeping as the ones we
propose here. Indeed, the core contribution of this Article is that clear
statement rules can—and should—be used to vindicate criminal law values.
Although we believe that the two specific clear statement rules we propose
would make criminal justice fairer and more efficient, one could reject or
modify these specific rules and yet accept our primary argument—that
courts should adopt criminal clear statement rules on the grounds that clear
statement rules can help ameliorate the dysfunction that plagues criminal
legislation.
Criminal clear statement rules will require legislators to say what they
mean and mean what they say when defining criminal liability. If
consistently deployed, they will have both short-term and long-term
benefits. In the short term, they will give society more notice about what is
prohibited, provide legislators a clearer idea about how to express
themselves, and modestly decrease prosecutorial discretion over the
substance of criminal laws. In the long term, they will restore a measure of
accountability to a legislative process by forcing legislators to internalize
the political costs of the decisions they make. This, in turn, might lead
legislators to deliberate more carefully about the crimes they create.
Criminal clear statement rules will also help to safeguard the legitimacy of
the courts at a time when the legitimacy of the justice system is under attack.
Finally, the specific rules we propose would protect criminal defendants
from thoughtlessly punitive penal statutes.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes legislative
dysfunction in the area of criminal law and explains how existing doctrines
have failed to deal with imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive laws.
Part II makes the affirmative case for criminal clear statement rules. It
begins by describing the role that clear statement rules currently play in
statutory interpretation. It then explains how to expand clear statement rules
to vindicate criminal law values, as well as how adopting criminal clear
statement rules could ameliorate legislative dysfunction. In particular, it
argues for the adoption of criminal clear statement rules that are grounded
in history, longstanding practices, and constitutional or quasi-constitutional
principles. Part III proposes our two specific clear statement rules—one
requiring a knowing mens rea, and the other requiring substantial harm.
I. DYSFUNCTION IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal legislation is deeply dysfunctional. Legislators engage in a
“bidding war” to see who can strike the most punitive tone in response to
public reports about crime. There are essentially no countervailing forces to
advocate in favor of more modest or more narrow legislation. The result is
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the routine enactment of crime laws that are imprecisely drafted, overly
broad, and overly punitive.
Current doctrine is ineffective at addressing these problems. Neither the
rule of lenity nor the void-for-vagueness doctrine have provided a
meaningful check against imprecise or overly broad laws. The overbreadth
doctrine, despite its name, plays only a small role in policing overly broad
laws. And outside of the death penalty and life-without-parole sentences for
juveniles, the courts will not police excessively punitive sentences.
A. Legislative Dysfunction
A wide and deep scholarly consensus exists that criminal legislation has
been dysfunctional for many years.22 This is true at both the federal and state
level. Legislatures pass penal laws that are severe and sweeping in scope.
Neither the public nor the other branches of government push back. The
cycle repeats itself again when some new crime captures the public’s
attention.
The eagerness of legislatures to write new criminal laws has resulted in
an explosion of criminal statutes. One study of federal legislation calculated
that, between 2000 and 2007, Congress enacted an average of fifty-six new
crimes each year.23 Another calculated that criminal statutes were enacted
at a rate that was 45 percent higher than all other types of legislation.24
This explosion has many causes. Victoria Nourse has described crime
legislation as driven by a cyclical series of “wars on crime.”25 Sara Sun
Beale has emphasized the role the media plays in distorting legislative
politics.26 And many have emphasized the sensitivity of legislators to moral
panics about crime over the last few decades.27 As Michael Tonry
explained:
Something or someone emerges who dramatically threatens
22.
See supra note 1 (collecting sources).
23.
John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes 1 (Heritage Found.
Memo No. 26, 2008), https://www.heritage.org/report/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-federal-crimes.
24.
BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND., WITHOUT INTENT: HOW
CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 13 (2010), https://www.
heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/without-intent-how-congress-eroding-the-criminal-intent-require
ment.
25.
V. F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV. 925,
925 (2004).
26.
Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 23, 44–51 (1997); see also HUSAK, supra note 1, at 16 (“Tabloids and the popular media thrive on
accounts of how offenders ‘get away’ with crime by escaping through loopholes and technicalities.”).
27.
See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 868–76; see also JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE
TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS 64–67 (1999).

360

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:351

established values and interests, the media and state agencies
overreact and exaggerate the nature and scale of the threat, public
opinion becomes polarized and demands decisive government
responses, public officials adopt extreme policies, and no one has
very much patience for suggestions that the problem is less serious or
more complicated than it looks.28
When legislators are responding to the outrage of the moment, they often
enact new legislation even though existing laws had already criminalized
the conduct and punished it with substantial penalties.29 The new legislation
does not have to be effective; it just has to strike the right chord with the
public’s anxieties of the moment.30 Such legislation satisfies symbolic
needs, not real ones. As a result, it is often poorly drafted and ill-considered.
Poor drafting results in imprecise or overly broad laws. Some laws fail
to define key terms31 or to clearly specify the required mental state.32 Others
are drafted so broadly that they include behavior that is blameless and
harmless.33 Once enacted, these laws are rarely repealed,34 even when their
extraordinary breadth becomes apparent.35
There are understandable reasons why legislators might write imprecise
or overly broad laws: “Carefully crafted laws require significant time and
effort, and both are often in short supply when legislatures are in session.”36
Precise laws also create a risk that would-be wrongdoers will circumvent
them.37 But investing this time and effort to strike the appropriate balance
28.
TONRY, supra note 1, at 88.
29.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (“Legislators gain political credit for responding to the crime du
jour with a new crime or an increased penalty, even if the new crime is redundant.”); Robinson & Cahill,
supra note 1, at 635 (documenting that, over four decades, Illinois added “hundreds of new offenses,
many of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses (and, in some cases, provide for conflicting
levels of punishment)”).
30.
TONRY, supra note 1, at 44 (“The inherently expressive character of much crime control
policy distinguishes it from other policy subjects.”).
31.
See Hessick, supra note 1, at 987–91 (collecting examples).
32.
WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 24, at 13.
33.
See Richman, supra note 3, at 761 (“Although the absolute or relative degree of breadth is
quite difficult to prove, let alone quantify, anyone with more than a passing familiarity with federal
criminal law is struck by the extraordinary extent to which Congress has eschewed legislative specificity
in this highly sensitive area.”).
34.
Myers, supra note 1, at 1337–39 (explaining why criminal laws are rarely repealed, even
when they no longer reflect public opinion).
35.
E.g., Bokor, supra note 7 (reporting that, when a broad statute was used to prosecute marginal
behavior, a lawmaker responded that he wished prosecutors would use better judgment, but that he was
not advocating for a change to the law itself).
36.
Hessick, supra note 1, at 993.
37.
See generally Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008)
(arguing that overly broad laws may, in some circumstances, be beneficial because they allow the state
to punish those who adapt their behavior to legal regimes).
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between catching wrongdoers and protecting the innocent is precisely the
job that legislators are supposed to do.
Importantly, there is no real political pressure on legislatures to write
carefully crafted laws. Legislative response to crime need not take account
of competing interests because the politics of crime are asymmetrical.38
Crime does not invite compromise and horse-trading because the issue is
framed in terms of good and evil, and no one likes to be seen as negotiating
in favor of evil.39 The interests of would be criminal defendants are routinely
neglected in legislative politics because no interest group represents them.
As Bill Stuntz explained:
In other fields, legislation is about tradeoffs and compromises. When
writing and enacting criminal prohibitions, legislators usually ignore
tradeoffs and rarely need to compromise. Save for law enforcement
lobbies, few organized, well-funded interest groups take an interest
in criminal statutes; criminal defendants’ interests nearly always go
unpresented in legislative hallways. Legislators thus have little
reason to focus carefully on the consequences of the prohibitions they
write.40
As a result, “both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war
to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime.’”41
Finally, there is a cognitive and rhetorical bias that has distorted the
legislative process for decades. For a variety of sociological, cultural, and
psychological reasons, crime and criminal offenders are conceived of, in the
abstract, in the worst possible terms. Drug dealers, burglars, and those
committing violent crimes are imagined to be monstrous offenders who are

38.
See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political
Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1980 (2006)
(explaining that, with the exception of those who care about white collar crime, “the groups that seek
shorter sentences and more flexible sentencing authority do not wield much political power”); Barkow,
supra note 5, at 1029–31 (contrasting the powerful lobbies for expansive and punitive criminal laws
with the weak groups that would oppose them). But cf. Richman, supra note 3, at 774–76 (noting that
some criminal laws, such as mail and wire fraud, target politically powerful white-collar individuals,
and yet “one rarely sees high-profile efforts by interest groups to limit purely criminal statutes” even for
white-collar crimes).
39.
See Beale, supra note 26, at 41–43 (recounting that Democrats “realized in the 1990s that
their traditional support of more liberal crime policies had become a major political liability” and
describing how “Democratic Congressional leaders deliberately adopted a strategy of taking the crime
issue away from the Republicans”); Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy
and Population Trends, in PRISONS 63, 71 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
40.
STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 1, at 173.
41.
Stuntz, Pathological, supra note 1, at 509; see also HUSAK, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that
“neither political party has been willing to allow the other to earn the reputation of being tougher on
crime”).
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dangerous, remorseless, and irredeemable.42 Serious crimes are defined in
sweeping terms in part to ensure that these monsters do not escape
punishment through some failure of proof. It is not that voters support
criminalization and punishment of trivial behavior. It is that they worry
prosecutors will be unable to find the evidence needed to prove that these
bad people did other, truly bad things.43 The result is a dysfunctional case
of bait-and-switch in which an enraged and fearful public support criminal
laws whose scope includes lesser offenders in addition to the monsters that
are the staple of legislative debate.44 Often lost in this dysfunctional game
is any guarantee that the offender intended or even contemplated the serious
harm that motivated the passage of the crime statute in the first place.45
This bias not only affects the drafting of the laws, but also the level of
punishment they impose. Criminal statutes increasingly contain harsher
sentences in the form of mandatory minimums and higher statutory
maximums.46 Since the 1970s, the percentage of defendants convicted of
42.
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 829–33, 858–76; see also BEST, supra note 27, at 24–26; PHILIP
JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 4–19
(1998). For example, most “drug dealers” are relatively minor offenders. Joseph E. Kennedy et al.,
Sharks and Minnows in the War on Drugs: A Study of Quantity, Race and Drug Type in Drug Arrests,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 767–73 (2018).
43.
See Stuntz, Pathological, supra note 1, at 519 (noting that when an element of a crime is
difficult to prove, legislatures can write a new statute that omits that element, leaving it to prosecutors
to decide when that element is present or not; the legislature is not so much redefining criminal
conduct—the real crime remains the same—but rather making it easier for the prosecutor to obtain a
conviction by removing the element as a formal matter).
Perhaps nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the case of child pornography cases.
In recent decades, Congress and state legislatures have dramatically increased the sentences for
possession of child pornography. These sentences have been increased not because lawmakers and
voters think that possession deserves this punishment, but rather because they have assumed that anyone
who possesses child pornography either has or will physically molest a child. See generally Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853
(2011). In other words, they have adjusted the punishment for one crime so that it captures the harm and
seriousness of another crime. And, although the evidence is far from uncontested, it appears that many
people who possess child pornography do not pose an actual threat to children. See Melissa Hamilton,
The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1694–1714
(2012).
44.
Kennedy, supra note 4, at 829–33, 858–76; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON
HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 19 (1999); Stephanos Bibas,
Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 929 (2006).
45.
ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 44, at 20.
46.
As Darryl Brown has explained:
[S]tates concluded harsh sentencing policies were successful elsewhere, and they feared being
a lower-sentence jurisdiction to whom harsh-sentencing states might push their criminals. The
competitive dynamic set up a cycle of states competing with each for
ever-harsher criminalization, enforcement, and punishment policies, which seems to have
leveled off—after exceeding the incarceration rates of all other democracies—only due to the
substantial strain that high incarceration rates put on state budgets.
Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a
Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 455 (2009).
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felonies who were sentenced to incarceration, rather than probation,
tripled.47 And sentence lengths have increased significantly.48 In short, we
are putting far more people in prison, and for much longer periods of time.
The executive branch has encouraged rather than checked this legislative
dysfunction. As Bill Stuntz has explained, the “pathological politics” of
criminal law result in legislators and prosecutors cooperating to endlessly
expand the criminal law:
[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from
more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges,
who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than
broader ones. . . . Prosecutors are better off when criminal law is
broad than when it is narrow. Legislators are better off when
prosecutors are better off. The potential for alliance is strong, and
obvious. . . .
. . . A deeper politics, a politics of institutional competition and
cooperation, always pushes toward broader liability rules, and toward
harsher sentences as well.49
Cooperation with prosecutors also insulates legislatures against voter
backlash. One might expect that the prosecution of individuals for
innocuous behavior under broadly written laws would provoke a response
by voters, but legislators can easily frame such a prosecution as a failure of
prosecutorial discretion.50 They can claim that this sort of prosecution is not
what they intended when they passed the imprecise or overbroad statute,
and instead simply reflects poor judgment on the part of the prosecutor filing
the charge.51 This evasion works, in part, because it is usually not clear to
anyone what the law meant in the first place. It is hard to hold legislators
accountable for the application of a law that no one understands. Thus,
legislators evade political responsibility for their decisions about the content
and scope of criminal laws.

47.
Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass
Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295 (2013).
48.
Id.; see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 1713 n.5.
49.
Stuntz, Pathological, supra note 1, at 510.
50.
Id. at 548.
51.
See supra note 7 (collecting sources).
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B. The Courts’ Failure to Address Dysfunction and Its Effects
One might expect the courts to step in when legislatures write imprecise,
overly broad, or overly punitive laws. Our Constitution separates power
between different branches in order to preserve individual liberty,52 and
imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive laws present a threat to
liberty.53 In addition, the text of the Constitution includes a prohibition on
excessive punishment.54 But there are both procedural and doctrinal reasons
why the courts have not served as an effective check.
As a procedural matter, the practice of plea bargaining has made it very
difficult for defendants to challenge a prosecutor’s interpretation of a broad
or imprecise statute. In contrast to civil cases, where judges routinely decide
the scope of statutes in the context of motions to dismiss, judges in criminal
cases usually refuse to make decisions about the scope of a criminal law at
the beginning of a criminal case.55 Instead, defendants’ substantive law
arguments are often addressed only after the jury has returned a verdict.
Since most cases do not go to trial, judges address the scope of the
substantive criminal law only in a small number of cases.56
Plea bargaining limits not only defendants’ ability to challenge
prosecutors’ interpretation of statutes, but also their ability to challenge
overly punitive sentences. Prosecutors routinely require defendants to waive
not only their right to a jury trial, but also many other procedural rights as
part of the plea bargain.57 Those waived rights often include the right to
appeal the sentence actually imposed on the defendant.58
Not only does plea bargaining insulate punitive sentences from review,
but our punitive sentences also help to drive plea bargaining. Our statutes
52.
Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011) (stating that individuals have standing to
challenge separation of powers violations because the “constitutional structure of our Government . . .
protects individual liberty”); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 29–32
(1965); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009); Hessick, supra note 1, at 1014; see also Shima
Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 1083–84 (2017)
(articulating these checks and noting that they have, at times, been underenforced).
53.
Hessick, supra note 15, at 1146–59 (explaining how imprecise and overly broad laws create
problems of notice and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement).
54.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
56.
And, even if the case proceeds to trial, the way that post-trial motions are structured also
results in opinions that do not clearly articulate the limits of criminal statutes. Russell M. Gold et al.,
Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1632–33, 1640–44 (2017).
57.
Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional
Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 92 (2015) (conducting study establishing that “a significant number
of prosecutors seek waivers of all statutory and constitutional claims regardless of whether such
violations occurred pre-trial, during the entry of a guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing, or thereafter”).
58.
Id. at 86–87, 122 app. H.
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authorize harsh punishments—punishments that legislators have conceded
exist to pressure defendants into pleading guilty and cooperating with
prosecutors.59 A defendant facing a harsh mandatory minimum, for
example, can escape that sentence by negotiating a guilty plea to a different
charge. The consequences of losing at trial are so severe that even innocent
people have pleaded guilty to serious crimes in order to secure a less severe
punishment.60 Our plea bargaining system has been highly effective. More
than 90 percent of convictions are the result of guilty pleas.61
Even when procedural hurdles have not prevented defendants from
challenging imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive laws, those
challenges have rarely succeeded. That is because existing doctrines are not
particularly effective at dealing with imprecise, overly broad, and overly
punitive statutes. Courts have used several doctrinal tools—most notably
the rule of lenity, the vagueness doctrine, and the overbreadth doctrine—to
narrow or invalidate certain criminal laws that are imprecise or overly
broad. But, as explained in more detail below, those tools have limitations
that keep them from effectively policing imprecise and overly broad laws.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
essentially avoid judicial review of harsh sentences of imprisonment. As a
result, courts have failed to act as a check on overly punitive laws.

59.
For example, Senator Chuck Grassley opposed legislation that would have reduced
mandatory minimum sentences, not because he disagreed with the argument that those sentences were
disproportionately harsh, but instead because prosecutorial discretion meant that those penalties were
not actually being imposed in all cases. He noted that:
[J]ust under half of all drug courier offenders were subject to mandatory minimum sentences,
but under 10 percent were subject to mandatory minimum sentences at the time of their
sentencing.
There are two main reasons so few of these offenders are actually sentenced to a mandatory
minimum. The first is they may fall within the safety valve Congress has enacted to prevent
mandatory minimum sentences from applying to low-level, first-time drug offenders or,
second, they may have provided substantial assistance to prosecutors in fingering high-level
offenders in a drug conspiracy.
That is an intended goal of current Federal sentencing policy, to put pressure on defendants
to cooperate in exchange for a lower sentence so evidence against more responsible criminals
can be attained. As a result, even for drug couriers the average sentence is 39 months. That
seems to be an appropriate level.
161 CONG. REC. 2240 (2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
60.
For a list of more than 2,000 individuals who pleaded guilty and were later exonerated, see
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.asp
x# [https://perma.cc/TA85-RUW2].
61.
Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences, 91 IND. L.J.
791, 816 (2016).
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1. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is generally understood to require judges to construe
ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants.62 The Supreme Court
has offered two justifications for the rule:
First, “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the
line should be clear.” Second, because of the seriousness of criminal
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the
moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts
should define criminal activity. This policy embodies “the instinctive
distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has
clearly said they should.”63
The rule of lenity is one of the oldest rules of statutory interpretation.64
The rule was previously stated in somewhat different terms—judges were
instructed to “narrowly construe” criminal statutes.65 Under this original
formulation, the rule was intended to soften the harsh effects of penal law.66
As a result, the rule benefitted defendants even when a law was not
necessarily ambiguous; instead, a judge was “to identify all the plausible
readings of the statute” and then “select the narrowest interpretation within
that set of plausible options.”67
In the hands of modern courts, however, the rule of lenity provides far
less protection to defendants. Modern courts use the rule of lenity as a tool

62.
See Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “rule of lenity” as
“[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient
punishment”).
63.
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348–49 (1971) (citations omitted) (first quoting
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); and then quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967)).
64.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); Amy Coney Barrett,
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 128 (2010); see also Lawrence M. Solan,
Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 87–96 (1998) (recounting lenity’s history in
England and the early United States).
65.
Barrett, supra note 64, at 128–29.
66.
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 897
(2004).
67.
Id. at 894, 896. Arguably, the rule of lenity originally operated as a clear statement rule of
sorts: if the statutory text did not clearly foreclose a more lenient interpretation, then the court would
construe the statute in that way. But unlike other clear statement rules, the rule of lenity did not identify
a particular issue that legislatures had to speak clearly about; they just generally had to avoid writing
criminal statutes that could be plausibly read to exclude certain behavior.

2019]

CRIMINAL CLEAR STATEMENT RULES

367

of last resort.68 Only if they have exhausted all other interpretive tools
without deriving an interpretation of the statute will judges use the rule of
lenity to break the tie between competing interpretations.69 Even when many
judges have disagreed about the meaning of a particular statute, a court will
nonetheless say that the statute is not ambiguous and refuse to employ the
rule of lenity. Consequently, in its current form, the rule of lenity only very
occasionally serves as a check on imprecise criminal laws.70
Even though lenity could serve (and on occasion has served) as a check
on imprecise criminal laws, it cannot address the other consequences of
criminal lawmaking dysfunction. That is because lenity comes into play
only when statutes are ambiguous. Thus, lenity would not help the
defendant who wanted to argue that a statute was written so broadly that it
included harmless or trivial behavior. She would have to show that the
statute could be read to exclude her behavior, not merely that it should have
been written to exclude it.71 Nor can lenity serve as a check on overly
punitive laws. So long as the scope of a law is clear, the rule of lenity does
not apply, no matter how harsh the penalty associated with that law.
In addition to providing no protection against overly broad or overly
punitive laws, lenity provides very little protection against imprecise laws.
Lack of precision is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, to trigger the
rule of lenity. Even a statute that is ambiguous on its face may be construed
to favor prosecution. That is because the courts look not only to the text of
the statute, but to all other possible sources of interpretation—including
legislative history72 and “motivating policies” of the statute73—before
deciding whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous for the rule of lenity to
apply. As Dan Kahan has noted, “[r]anking lenity ‘last’ among interpretive
conventions all but guarantees its irrelevance.”74
68.
Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 384–86.
69.
See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have always reserved lenity
for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort
to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.” (quoting
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980))); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971)
(stating that a court should rely on lenity only if, “[a]fter ‘seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be
derived,’” it is “left with an ambiguous statute” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fisher,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))); see also Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity,
Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 106–20 (2016) (tracing the decreasing
force of lenity in court opinions); Price, supra note 66, at 891 (noting that prevailing doctrine “ranks
lenity dead last in the interpretive hierarchy”).
70.
Price, supra note 66, at 891 (“Lenity comes into play only in the unlikely event that other
conventions yield an interpretive ‘tie.’”).
71.
See Solan, supra note 64, at 79 (making this distinction).
72.
See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 500 n.19 (1984).
73.
Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (quoting Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387).
74.
Kahan, supra note 68, at 386.
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A number of commenters have argued that we should reinvigorate the
rule of lenity and return to a system in which statutes that are not entirely
clear on their face are interpreted in favor of criminal defendants.75 We also
regret that the rule of lenity has become a shadow of its former self. But we
do not believe that lenity is likely to make a comeback any time soon. Given
the current political hostility to “activist” interpretive practices, it is hard to
imagine judges ignoring legislative history and purpose in order to revive
an ancient judicial canon.
Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of the rule of lenity—that it is
necessary to ensure that defendants had notice that their conduct was
illegal—is both unlikely to be persuasive in a particular case, and it is not
consistent with modern criminal practice. The modern regulatory state
contains many criminal prohibitions and so the idea that precisely worded
statutes provide notice is a legal fiction in all but the most formal sense of
the word.76 Most importantly, lenity requires judges to place a thumb on the
interpretive scale in favor of criminal defendants simply because they are
criminal defendants. That is hardly the sort of action that is likely to be
palatable to judges—especially judges who must stand for reelection.77
Thus, the prospects for meaningful reform through a reinvigorated rule of
lenity are poor, and a solution to the legislative dysfunction around criminal
law making must come from elsewhere.
2. The Vagueness Doctrine
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a criminal statute “clearly
define the conduct it proscribes.”78 While related to lenity on a conceptual

75.
See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 1, at 740–42; Price, supra note 66, at 940–41; see also Solan,
supra note 64, at 123–28, 134–43 (arguing against modern trends in the states to abolish lenity via
legislation). But see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985) (arguing that lenity should be replaced by a principle requiring
courts to interpret statutes to maximize the rule of law); Kahan, supra note 68 (arguing that lenity should
be abolished).
76.
See Jeffries, supra note 75, at 205–12.
77.
Although federal judges are appointed and enjoy life tenure, the vast majority of state judges
owe their seats to either direct elections or retention elections. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE
PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 3 (2012). Indeed, interest groups
seeking to advance non-criminal law interests have targeted state judges who are opposed to those
interests in their reelection campaigns by running ads about their defense-friendly rulings. See id. at 1–
3 (collecting recent incidents); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common
Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 n.74 (1995) (collecting
incidents from the 1980s and 1990s).
78.
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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level,79 vagueness differs in two very important respects. First, the rule of
lenity leads courts to construe statutes strictly, but the vagueness doctrine
leads courts to strike down laws.80 Second, while lenity is a rule of statutory
construction, vagueness is a constitutional doctrine.81
Vague criminal laws violate the Due Process Clauses.82 Over the years,
the Supreme Court has found a number of laws to be unconstitutionally
vague. In Kolender v. Lawson,83 the Court struck down a California statute
requiring persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide “credible
and reliable” identification whenever requested by the police. The Court
held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to clarify
what constituted “credible and reliable” identification. In Smith v. Goguen,84
the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that criminalized public
contemptuous treatment of the U.S. flag because it failed to define
“contemptuous treatment.” More recently, in Johnson v. United States,85 the
Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a provision of the Armed
Career Criminal Act that defined a violent felony as, inter alia, a crime that
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.”86

79.
See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (describing vagueness and lenity
as “related manifestations of the fair warning requirement” of the right to due process); HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95 (1968) (describing lenity as a sort of “junior
version of the vagueness doctrine”); Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1174,
1176–77 (2013) (describing vagueness and lenity as two “main features of due process notice doctrine”).
80.
Justice Thomas has recently challenged whether this aspect of the vagueness doctrine is
appropriate. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1243–44 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Johnson
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
81.
States can presumably abrogate a rule of statutory construction. See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at
1244 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[L]enity is a tool of statutory construction, which means States can
abrogate it—and many have. The vagueness doctrine, by contrast, is a rule of constitutional law that
States cannot alter or abolish.” (citations omitted)). But some courts have persisted in applying the rule
even when legislatures have abrogated it. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744, 748–49 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983) (“A.R.S. § 13-104 abolishes the general rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed;
nevertheless, where the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity
dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”); see also Solan, supra note 64, at
123–28 (describing similar dynamics in New York and California).
82.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1224–26 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (tracing the vagueness doctrine’s “due process
underpinnings”).
83.
461 U.S. 352 (1983).
84.
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
85.
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
86.
Id. at 2557; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (defining a violent felony to
include state or federal court convictions for any felony that “(i) has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another”).
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The Supreme Court has offered three reasons why a vague criminal
statute violates the right to due process.87 First, vague laws give insufficient
notice to citizens about what conduct is permitted and what conduct is
prohibited.88 Without such notice, an individual may accidentally engage in
illegal conduct.89 In order to avoid conviction under vague statutes, citizens
may be deterred from engaging in lawful behavior out of fear that the
conduct is actually prohibited.90 So not only are vague statutes a trap for the
unwary, they may also result in over-deterrence.
The second rationale for the vagueness prohibition is that vague statutes
provide “insufficient standards for enforcement.”91 When a statute fails to
give police and prosecutors a clear indication of what conduct is legal, the
statute “vests virtually complete discretion in the hands” of law
enforcement.92 According to the Court, such unfettered discretion may
result in “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”93 because it “allows
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”94
The third rationale is that vague statutes delegate too much of the
legislature’s power to make the law.95 In United States v. Reese, the Court
stated that it would be dangerous if the legislature were to write a statute
that “set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to
the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who
87.
E.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (“To satisfy due process, ‘a
penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357)); see also
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (adding excessive delegation as a third
reason).
88.
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 572 (“The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning.”).
89.
Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09 (“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning.”).
90.
United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (“[W]e are concerned with
the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally
protected and socially desirable conduct.”).
91.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982).
92.
Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; see also Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578 (remarking on the “the
unfettered latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact” under a vague statute).
93.
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573.
94.
Id. at 575.
95.
See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 284–86 (2003) (collecting cases on the delegation issue and noting
that the separation of powers “stood for decades as the second requirement of vagueness analysis”).
While the Court has mentioned notice and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in all of its modern
vagueness opinions, the delegation issue appears in only some of those opinions. See Sessions v.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court’s precedents have
occasionally described the vagueness doctrine in terms of nondelegation. But they have not been
consistent on this front.” (citation omitted)).
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should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for
the legislative department of the government.”96 In Sessions v. Dimaya,
Justice Gorsuch underscored the vagueness doctrine’s commitment to
preserving the separation of powers.97 He emphasized that:
[L]egislators may not “abdicate their responsibilities for setting the
standards of the criminal law,” by leaving to judges the power to
decide “the various crimes includable in [a] vague phrase” . . . . Nor
is the worry only that vague laws risk allowing judges to assume
legislative power. Vague laws also threaten to transfer legislative
power to police and prosecutors, leaving to them the job of shaping a
vague statute’s contours through their enforcement decisions.98
Although the vagueness doctrine seems ready-made to limit imprecise
laws, the courts have failed to develop a clear standard for what constitutes
an impermissibly vague law.99 As Justice Frankfurter famously observed,
the standard for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally
imprecise is, itself, imprecise.100 That has led to what appear to be
inconsistent applications of the standard.
For example, in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. the Court struck
down a price gouging statute which prohibited any person from “mak[ing]
any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with
any necessaries.”101 The Court reasoned that such an open-ended,
qualitative standard was unconstitutionally vague because it made the
legality or illegality of conduct wholly contingent upon whether the
defendant’s conduct was “unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the
court and jury.”102 But in Nash v. United States, the Court rejected a similar
vagueness challenge to the Sherman Act, which has been applied using the
96.
92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876); see also United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92
(1921) (noting that standardless statutes “delegate legislative power”).
97.
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1227–28 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
98.
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575; and then quoting Jordan v. De
George, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
99.
See Jeffries, supra note 75, at 196 (“The difficulty is that there is no yardstick of
impermissible indeterminacy.”).
100. “‘[I]ndefiniteness’ is not a quantitative concept. It is not even a technical concept of definite
components. It is itself an indefinite concept.” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At the time, the Court frequently referred to the concept of vagueness as
“indefiniteness.” See id. (“This requirement of fair notice that there is a boundary of prohibited conduct
not to be overstepped is included in the conception of ‘due process of law.’ The legal jargon for such
failure to give forewarning is to say that the statute is void for ‘indefiniteness.’”).
101. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 86 (quoting Act of October 22, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-63,
§ 2, 41 Stat. 297, 298).
102. Id. at 89.
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so-called “rule of reason.”103 Writing for the majority in Nash, Justice
Holmes stated that “the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends
on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some
matter of degree.”104 Compounding the confusion, in a recent decision, the
Court reaffirmed both L. Cohen Grocery and Nash despite their apparent
incompatibility.105
One assumes that the Justices have been, well, vague about vagueness
because they understand that precise laws are difficult to write. Language is
necessarily imprecise.106 Overly precise laws permit would-be criminals to
circumvent the law.107 And, as the Court observed in Schall v. Martin, the
law often requires judgment calls, and the factors that are necessary to make
such judgments “cannot be readily codified.”108 But whatever the reason,
because the vagueness doctrine has not developed as a predictable standard,
it is a very limited tool to restrict imprecise laws.
Even if the courts were to develop a more precise standard for when a
law is vague, the vagueness doctrine would not be able to solve the problem
of overly broad or overly punitive laws. The vagueness doctrine prohibits
only imprecise laws; it does not place limits on precisely worded laws that
sweep in large amounts of seemingly innocuous conduct or on laws that
impose harsh punishments. To be sure, the enforcement of overly broad
laws raises some of the same problems as vague laws.109 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “the breadth of discretion that our
country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the
potential for both individual and institutional abuse.”110 But the Court has
103. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (applying the rule of reason to the Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co.
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (same); Note, Potential Restraint of Trade Under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 2 VA. L. REV. 140, 142 (1914) (describing how the Court “firmly and finally
established” the “rule of reason” in its antitrust cases).
104. Nash, 229 U.S. at 377–78.
105. Compare Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015) (“[W]e have deemed a law
prohibiting grocers from charging an ‘unjust or unreasonable rate’ void for vagueness—even though
charging someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust and unreasonable. . . .
These decisions refute any suggestion that the existence of some obviously risky crimes establishes the
residual clause’s constitutionality.” (citing L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89)), with id. (“As a
general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative
standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct; ‘the law is full of instances where a man’s fate
depends on his estimating rightly . . . some matter of degree.’” (quoting Nash, 229 U.S. at 377)).
106. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945) (“In most English words and
phrases there lurk uncertainties.”).
107. See Buell, supra note 37, at 1507–12.
108. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278–80 (1984). This may explain why the Supreme Court
recently indicated that qualitative standards, standing alone, are not enough to render a statute
unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561.
109. See Hessick, supra note 15, at 1152–62 (making this argument in detail).
110. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
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limited the vagueness doctrine to statutes that are vague as written, rather
than as applied.111
Finally, there may be practical reasons why the Court has not developed
a robust vagueness doctrine. The remedy for a successful vagueness
challenge is the invalidation of a statute—a remedy that runs counter to the
principles of judicial self-restraint.112 As others have explained, courts will
sometimes narrow the substance of a right in order to avoid awarding a
substantial remedy.113 Thus, it is possible that the courts have failed to
develop a robust vagueness doctrine—and will fail to do so in the future—
in order to avoid striking down a large number of statutes.
3. The Overbreadth Doctrine
At one point, the Supreme Court appeared poised to place substantive
limits on the legislature’s ability to enact broad criminal laws—in particular
laws that swept in blameless everyday activity. Early drafts of Justice
Douglas’s opinion in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville114 argued that the
Ninth Amendment’s catchall limitation on government power115 created an
individual right to walk, stroll, and loaf; and, if such rights existed, then
laws infringing on such rights were subject to strict scrutiny.116
But Papachristou was ultimately decided on vagueness grounds, and the
modern view is that the legislature is (and ought to be) the primary
decisionmaker about the scope of criminal law.117 Legislatures decide which
111. See Hessick, supra note 15, at 1153–54.
112. Cf. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2567–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning
the validity of the vagueness doctrine in part based on whether the Constitution gives the courts the
power “to nullify statutes on that ground”).
113. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
857, 884–85 (1999).
114. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
116. Risa L. Goluboff, Essay, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion,
and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1361, 1365–66, 1376–77 (2010) (describing Draft Opinion, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No.
70-5030 (Dec. 28, 1971) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558)).
117. See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (noting that “the substantive power to
define crimes and prescribe punishments” lies with the “legislative branch of government”); Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is
entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of
statute.”); see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995) (“Our legal culture’s understanding of the link
between statutory interpretation and democratic theory verges on the canonical and is embodied in the
principle of ‘legislative supremacy.’”). That is not to say that the legislature is the only decisionmaker.
Historically, judges were the institution that defined most crimes and defenses. See 1 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that “the substantive criminal law
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conduct to criminalize, and there are only modest limits on this legislative
power. Laws that infringe on the clearly established constitutional rights of
individuals are prohibited.118 But there is no limit on how much unprotected
behavior can be criminalized. Consequently, legislatures have been able to
pass criminal laws that sweep in conduct that is unremarkable or morally
blameless. The proliferation of such laws is often referred to as
“overcriminalization.”119
To be sure, the Court has adopted an overbreadth doctrine, but that
doctrine is quite limited. The overbreadth doctrine applies only in a small
number of contexts, such as when criminal laws sweep so broadly as to
include conduct that is protected by the First Amendment.120 The legislative
dysfunction described above only rarely results in laws that implicate
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Thus, the overbreadth doctrine
is simply not a viable tool to check that dysfunction.
4. Prohibitions on Excessive Punishment
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits “excessive bail,”
“excessive fines,” and “cruel and unusual punishment.”121 Although the
constitutional text speaks in terms of “cruel and unusual punishment,” rather
than “excessive punishment,” the courts have read the Amendment to limit
excessive punishment as well. In particular, the Supreme Court has said that

began as common law for the most part, and only later became primarily statutory”). And judges retain
at least some of that power today. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 980–87.
118. Some of the most well-known constitutional law cases were challenges to criminal laws. See,
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state law that criminalized
interracial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding it unconstitutional to
prohibit the dispensation of contraception to married persons despite a state law that imposed a fine and
at least sixty days imprisonment for using contraception).
119. Hopwood, supra note 1, at 699 n.24.
120. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (cataloguing the “relatively few
settings” in which the Court has “relax[ed] familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination
that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from
those at hand”); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (noting “the general rule that a person
to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may
be unconstitutionally applied to others”); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S.
217, 219–20 (1912) (refusing to entertain an overbreadth argument that a statute would be
unconstitutional if applied in different circumstances not presented by the instant case); see also Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859–60 (1991) (“Outside the First
Amendment context . . . . absent a relationship that makes the actual enjoyment of rights by a third party
dependent on a challenger’s capacity to assert those rights, one party may not escape the application of
a statute on the ground that it would be unconstitutional as applied to someone else.” (footnote omitted)).
121. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if it is disproportionate to the
defendant’s crime.122
Importantly, the Court has adopted different standards of
disproportionality for different types of punishment.123 The Justices have
closely monitored whether death penalty sentences are disproportionate.124
More recently, they have also conducted searching review in cases
involving life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.125 But for adult
sentences of incarceration, the Court has all but abdicated its judicial review
function. The Court has said that an adult’s sentence of incarceration is
permitted by the Eighth Amendment as long as the government “has a
reasonable basis for believing” that the sentence “advance[s] the goals of
[its] criminal justice system in any substantial way.”126 This test is
essentially low-level rational-basis review.127
Given the test that the Court has adopted, it is entirely unsurprising that
it has almost never held an adult sentence of incarceration to be
unconstitutional.128 Unless and until the Court decides to adopt a different
doctrinal test, the Eighth Amendment will not serve as a check on overly
punitive laws.129
II. CLEAR STATEMENT RULES AS A SOLUTION FOR DYSFUNCTION
Current doctrine has proven ineffective at addressing the legislative
dysfunction associated with criminal law. But an existing doctrinal tool—if
it were extended—could help to ameliorate the dysfunction. In particular, if
122. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (noting the basic “precept of
justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense”).
123. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155–62 (2009) (documenting
how the Supreme Court’s proportionality review is more robust in capital cases than in non-capital
cases).
124. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
125. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
126. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22 (1983)).
127. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV.
677, 741–42 (2005) (suggesting that the test is akin to rational basis). It is noteworthy that the Court has
adopted this test because it runs counter to the general principle that claims of individual rights violations
must be protected by something more than rational basis review. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008).
128. “There has been only a single case in the Court’s history in which a term of incarceration,
standing alone, was held to be disproportionate to an otherwise validly defined crime.” Barkow, supra
note 123, at 1160 (referring to Solem v. Helm, in which the Court rejected as unconstitutional a
mandatory life sentence without the possibility for parole for a defendant who had six prior non-violent
felonies and who wrote a “no-account” check for $100).
129. See, e.g., State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006) (rejecting an Eighth Amendment
challenge to a two-hundred-year sentence for possession of child pornography).
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new clear statement rules were adopted to vindicate criminal justice values,
then legislatures would be forced to speak more clearly and to internalize
more fully the political costs associated with their decisions to increase the
scope of criminal law. And, to the extent legislatures failed to speak clearly,
then courts would interpret criminal laws in a less punitive fashion.
This Section describes how clear statement rules currently operate and
explains why courts should develop additional clear statement rules that
protect important criminal justice values. To be clear, we are not attempting
to justify, in the abstract, the use of clear statement rules in statutory
interpretation. For one thing, others have already offered such
justifications.130 For another, courts routinely use clear statements to
vindicate other values.131 Indeed, courts have used clear statement rules to
interpret criminal statutes when those statutes implicate the other, noncriminal justice values protected by existing clear statement rules.132 Our
argument is simply that, in light of the fact that we already use clear
statement rules in the interpretation of statutes, we should adopt additional
clear statement rules to counteract the legislative dysfunction that plagues
criminal law.
A. Clear Statement Rules Generally
A clear statement rule is a particularly strong presumption that applies
during statutory interpretation.133 A clear statement rule presumes that a
statute does not infringe on a particular value unless the legislature has
affirmatively and clearly stated that it intends to do so.134 There are many
individual clear statement rules that operate in various areas. For example,
the Supreme Court has adopted a number of federalism clear statement

130. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 921, 958–59 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000);
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000).
131. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509,
1542–48 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997)) (documenting a large number of cases decided between 1987 and 1994 in which a
wide variety of substantive canons, including clear statement rules, were invoked). But see Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 855–59 (2017)
(documenting far fewer cases invoking a smaller number of substantive canons during the first six and
a half terms of the Roberts Court).
132. E.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014).
133. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 595 n.4 (distinguishing between clear statement rules,
super-strong clear statement rules, and less strong presumptions in statutory interpretation).
134. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 401–02 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 457–58 (1989).
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rules.135 Those rules include the rule against congressional waiver of states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court and the rule
against congressional regulation of core state functions.136 When
interpreting federal statutes that affect the states, the courts use these
specific clear statement rules in order to preserve the balance of state and
federal power. For example, courts will not interpret a statute to subject a
state to suit in the federal courts unless the statute specifically says so.137
The term “clear statement rule” has sometimes been used to refer to a
presumption that can be overcome relatively easily. But we are using the
term “clear statement rule” to refer to what others have called “super-strong
clear statement rules”—namely “very strong presumptions of statutory
meaning that can be rebutted only through unambiguous statutory text
targeted at the specific problem.”138 Put differently, as we use the term, a
“clear statement rule” would require a particular outcome unless a statute
affirmatively and clearly required the opposite result.139
Clear statement rules have a long history in American jurisprudence.
Take, for example, the rule against retroactive application of civil
statutes.140 The Constitution prohibits both Congress and the states from
passing retroactive criminal laws; but that prohibition does not extend to
civil laws.141 Nonetheless, courts will not apply a civil statute retroactively

135.

Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE
Fitzgerald Duffy & Michael
Herz eds., 2005); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1968–73 (1994) [hereinafter Note, Clear Statement Rules].
136. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 619–29 (grouping together these clear statement
rules with others as “federalism canons”).
137. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 228 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
138. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 611–12; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at
835 (contrasting presumptions and clear statement rules).
139. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 73 (contrasting clear statement rules, which “require a textual
statement to defeat them,” from “[o]ther canons of construction . . . [that] can be overcome by specific
evidence in the text or legislative history”); Shapiro, supra note 130, at 940 (stating that “clear statement
rules are akin to ‘presumptions’ or ‘tie-breakers,’ but go one step further” because they “embody the
view that the legislature can achieve a particular result only by explicit statement”).
140. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268–73 (1994). But see Garrett, supra
note 135, at 73 (stating that the rule against retroactive application of statutes is not a clear statement
rule, but rather a canon of construction which can be overcome (at least in some cases) by legislative
history, rather than requiring a statement in the text of legislation).
141. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Congress from passing ex post facto laws); id. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from passing ex post facto laws); see Jeffrey Omar Usman,
Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal
Constitution and Unrealized Potential of State Constitutions, 14 NEV. L.J. 63, 66–68 (2013) (noting that
the ex post facto clauses are not textually limited to criminal, as compared to civil laws, but that they
have nonetheless been consistently interpreted in that fashion).
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55, 74 (John
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unless the legislature “made clear its intent.”142 As early as 1806, the
Supreme Court refused to give retroactive effect to a civil statute that did
not include “clear, strong, and imperative” language requiring retroactive
application.143
Clear statement rules diverge from other contemporary approaches to
statutory interpretation.144 The two leading schools of statutory
interpretation are textualism and purposivism.145 Textualism tells judges
that they must interpret statutes based solely on the words in the statute. It
also tells them to interpret those words based on how an ordinary or
reasonable listener would understand them.146 Purposivism, in contrast,
instructs judges to interpret a statute based on the legislature’s purpose for
enactment, even if that purpose is not necessarily reflected in the text of the
statute.147 Clear statement rules do not seek to determine the meaning of a
statute based on either a hypothetical reasonable listener or the purpose of
lawmakers. Instead, clear statement rules create a substantive bias in favor
of a particular interpretive outcome—a bias that can be overcome only if
the legislature includes an affirmative, unambiguous statement indicating
that it intended the opposite result.
Take, for example, the clear statement rule against federal regulation of
core state functions.148 Although Congress clearly has the authority to
preempt state policies,149 the courts will presume that federal legislation
does not preempt state law in areas traditionally regulated by the states

142. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. There was, in the early days of the Republic, disagreement about
whether the ex post facto clauses extended to civil statutes as well. See Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto
in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81 KY. L.J. 323, 327–33 (1992) (collecting sources). But
the clauses were, even in early cases, interpreted to extend only to criminal cases. See Usman, supra
note 141, at 66–68.
143. United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (opinion of Paterson, J.).
144. See Barrett, supra note 64, at 121–25; Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 135, at 1959–
60.
145. See Barrett, supra note 64, at 112; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr, The Meaning of Legal
“Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1237
(2015) (“Prominent competing theories of statutory interpretation include textualism, legislative
intentionalism, and purposivism.”).
146. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 131, at 17; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent
in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988).
147. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1118–26 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
Foundation Press 1994) (1958).
148. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 623–25.
149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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unless Congress explicitly says otherwise.150 Thus, in Gregory v.
Ashcroft,151 the Supreme Court refused to apply the Federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to prevent Missouri from
requiring its judges to retire by age seventy. The ADEA explicitly included
the states as employers,152 but it exempted some state officials. The Court
conceded that a straightforward reading of the statutory exemption did not
extend it to judges.153 (In other words, the most sensible reading of the
statute would prohibit Missouri’s mandatory retirement age for judges.) But
the Court nonetheless upheld the mandatory retirement age for judges,
stating: “We will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress
has made it clear that judges are included.”154
Clear statement rules differ not only from these general approaches to
statutory interpretation, but also from the specialized doctrines that apply to
the interpretation of criminal statutes. The rule of lenity—especially the
modern version—provides an example. Lenity tells judges that they should
resolve ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of defendants.155 In that
respect, one might argue that lenity is a type of clear statement rule: if the
legislature does not clearly indicate that particular behavior is illegal, then
the courts will presume that conduct is permitted. Indeed, commenters have
sometimes grouped together clear statement rules, lenity, and other
substantive canons of construction in their discussions of statutory
interpretation.156 But the modern rule of lenity is a tool of last resort; courts
will employ it only if all other interpretive tools have been exhausted.157 In
150. Michael P. Lee, How Clear is “Clear”?: A Lenient Interpretation of the Gregory v. Ashcroft
Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (1998).
151. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
152. Id. at 456 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2012)).
153. Id. at 466–67 (stating that the language of the statutory exemption “is an odd way for
Congress to exclude judges”).
154. Id. at 467.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971).
156. E.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 598–611 (grouping the rule of lenity together
with traditional clear statement rules and other constitutionally-based presumptions); Sunstein, supra
note 134, at 471 (characterizing the rule of lenity as one example of “a clear-statement principle in favor
of the ‘rule of law’: a system in which legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not apply
retroactively, operate in the world as they do in the books, and do not contradict each other”); see also
Shapiro, supra note 130, at 925 (rejecting distinctions between so-called linguistic canons, including the
“much maligned canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, the
more sympathetically viewed rule of lenity, the presumption against implied repeal, and virtually all of
the recently strengthened ‘clear-statement’ rules articulated by the Supreme Court”).
157. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have always reserved lenity
for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort
to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.” (quoting
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980))); Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (stating that a court should
rely on lenity only if, “[a]fter ‘seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be derived,’” it is “left with an
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contrast, clear statement rules are a tool of first resort. Courts will employ a
clear statement rule at the beginning of the interpretive process—the stage
at which they are deciding on the “plain meaning” of statutory language.158
The rule of lenity also differs from clear statement rules with respect to
specificity. Lenity applies whenever a statute is ambiguous. Legislatures are
unable to anticipate the multitude of factual situations that will arise in the
future, and thus they cannot always clearly indicate how their statute ought
to be applied in all of those future situations. In other words, legislatures do
not know whether the statutory language they choose will later be deemed
ambiguous. In contrast, clear statement rules identify specific questions of
statutory construction and tell legislators that courts will interpret those
questions a particular way unless the statute includes a clear statement to
the contrary.
Clear statement rules have been the subject of academic debate.159 While
some have defended the practice or even called for their expansion,160 others
have voiced concerns about clear statement rules.161 One major criticism of
clear statement rules is that they allow the judiciary to intrude on the domain
of the legislature when they elevate one value above others.162 For example,
many of the federalism clear statement rules prioritize the ability of states
to set local policy above the interest of the federal government in promoting
uniform policy across states.163 The reconciliation of conflicting values, so
the argument goes, is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.164 And when
the courts use a clear statement rule to choose between competing values,
they are arguably acting in a countermajoritarian fashion.165
Some have responded that this competing values critique is less
persuasive when the values that the courts choose to elevate through clear

ambiguous statute” (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))); see also
Ortner, supra note 69, at 106–20 (tracing the decreasing force of lenity in court opinions); Price, supra
note 66, at 891 (noting that prevailing doctrine “ranks lenity dead last in the interpretive hierarchy”).
158. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (“Generally, courts use substantive canons, including the
clear statement rules, at [Chevron] step one to determine the extent to which statutory meaning is
clear.”).
159. See Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at 835–39 (collecting sources).
160. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 130; Young, supra note 130.
161. E.g., Barrett, supra note 64; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20; Manning, supra note 134.
162. In this respect, the arguments against clear statements fall within a broader trope of arguments
in favor of “judicial minimalism” or “judicial restraint,” in which a court ought to “limit its interpretive
work to a fairly mechanical retrieval of legislative meaning” and thus “permit majorities to identify and
evaluate policy choices made by elected officials and to keep such choices uncluttered by judicial
policymaking that masquerades as interpretation.” Schacter, supra note 117, at 597.
163. It also sets the policies chosen by states above the particular policies that the federal
government chooses to promote.
164. Manning, supra note 134, at 426.
165. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 637.
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statement rules are grounded in the Constitution.166 After all,
countermajoritarianism is necessary when majorities would act contrary to
the Constitution.167 But, as John Manning has countered, the Constitution
does not merely enshrine certain principles in abstract terms; instead the text
of the Constitution itself represents a compromise. So, in Manning’s view,
efforts to elevate some of the principles behind those compromises through
clear statement rules is misguided because “the Constitution does not adopt
values in the abstract.”168
Despite these criticisms, clear statement rules have proven to be quite
popular in recent decades.169 And, as we explain below, they are a promising
means of mitigating legislative dysfunction in criminal lawmaking.
B. Criminal Clear Statement Rules
Just as the courts have developed clear statement rules to protect
important values such as federalism and the separation of powers, so too
should they adopt clear statement rules to protect important criminal justice
values. In addition to protecting those values, clear statement rules will
soften the effects of the legislative dysfunction we described above.170 Clear
statement rules would force legislatures to speak explicitly and
unambiguously if they wanted to enact criminal laws that implicate various
constitutional or common law rights. Otherwise, their statutes will be
interpreted in a way that is more protective of individual liberty.
This Section makes the affirmative case for criminal clear statement
rules. It identifies the many ways in which criminal clear statement rules are
consistent with the substance and the structure of the Constitution. It
explains how criminal clear statement rules can provide a counterweight to
the current punitive dysfunction in the legislatures while maintaining an
appropriate balance of power between the courts and the legislative branch.
166. Young, supra note 130, at 1591–94.
167. As Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers:
From a body which had had even a partial agency in passing bad laws we could rarely expect
a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had
operated in making them would be too apt to operate in interpreting them; still less could it be
expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators would be
disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. . . .
These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed
the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and
independent bodies of men.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 483–84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
168. Manning, supra note 134, at 428–32.
169. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 619–28. But see Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at
847–59 (documenting a relatively low number of Roberts Court cases employing clear statement rules).
170. See supra Part I.A.
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It argues that criminal clear statement rules allow judges to interpret statutes
narrowly while providing political insulation for those decisions. And it also
gives more detail about how criminal clear statement rules would operate in
practice.
1. Identifying Criminal Justice Values
Because clear statement rules elevate some values over others,171 it is
important to identify the values that would form the basis of criminal clear
statement rules. Some have suggested that clear statement rules ought to be
grounded in the Constitution.172 And courts have often justified clear
statement rules by explaining how the rule furthers values protected
elsewhere in the Constitution.173 Ample constitutional text exists to warrant
clear statement rules in the area of criminal law. But explicit constitutional
guarantees should not be the only basis for clear statement rules; values
from the common law or historical practice can also serve as the basis for
criminal clear statement rules.
The Constitution clearly values protecting criminal defendants from state
power, as well as protecting liberty more generally. It contains a number of
explicit protections for criminal defendants: it secures the writ of habeas
corpus,174 protects against ex post facto laws,175 secures the right to a trial
by jury,176 secures the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures,177 secures the right to a grand jury indictment,178 protects against
double jeopardy,179 provides for the due process of law,180 secures the right
to a local and public trial,181 secures the right to confrontation,182 provides
for the right of compulsory process,183 secures the right to counsel,184 and

171. See supra notes 162–168 and accompanying text.
172. See Young, supra note 130, at 1591–94; see also Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (stating that
clear statement rules “must be justified by convincing reasons rooted in the Constitution or a theory of
democratic governance”).
173. E.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (justifying a clear statement rule
against the retroactive application of civil statutes by reference to “the antiretroactivity principle [which]
finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution”).
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1.
176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
179. Id.
180. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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protects against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishment.185
The Constitution also—both explicitly and through its structure—
protects personal liberty. The Preamble states that the Constitution is meant
to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”186 The
Preamble to the Bill of Rights states that the amendments were being added
because delegates at a number of state conventions adopting the
Constitution “expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or
abuse of [the government’s] powers, that further declaratory and restrictive
clauses should be added.”187 The Ninth Amendment makes clear that the
enumeration of rights in the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”188 And the major structural
features of the Constitution—the separation of powers and federalism—
have long been explained as features that protect individual rights.189
To be sure, the Constitution also creates some affirmative power for the
government in criminal prosecutions,190 and Article I plainly contemplates
that Congress will use its powers to create criminal laws.191 But that
affirmative power is far more circumscribed than the protections that it
affords to individuals. For example, the Constitution assigns to Congress the
“Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,” but it also places limitations
on what that punishment can be, gives an exclusive definition for the crime
of treason, and sets a floor for what type of evidence is necessary to establish
the crime of treason.192 In short, it is impossible to read the text of the
Constitution and not be left with the distinct impression that those who
wrote and ratified it did so, in significant part, in order to protect individuals
from government power, in general, and to protect those individuals accused
and convicted of crimes, in particular. Thus, an ample constitutional
foundation exists for the adoption of clear statement rules to regulate the
legislative definition of criminal liability.

185. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
186. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
187. U.S. CONST. pmbl. bill of rights, reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, POCKET EDITION 20, 20 (2007).
188. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
189. E.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 181 (1992); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513
(1991); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE
L.J. 1672, 1677 (2012); Rhett B. Larson, Interstitial Federalism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 908, 922 (2015).
190. For example, it creates the power of extradition, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
191. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (granting Congress the power to “provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States”).
192. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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Importantly, the repeated and cumulative protection of criminal
defendants in the Constitution suggests that Manning’s Constitution-ascompromise critique of clear statement rules applies with far less force to
criminal clear statement rules.193 Manning articulated his critique in
response to clear statements designed to protect the separation of powers
and federalism—areas in which the Constitution is more equivocal. It is
clear, for example, that the Constitution does not whole-heartedly embrace
separated powers.194 Indeed, it includes multiple instances in which a branch
is assigned a power ordinarily reserved for another, such as the power of the
Vice President to break congressional ties in the Senate,195 and the
requirement that the President seek the advice and consent of the Senate for
treaties and the appointment of executive officers.196 Nor does the
Constitution reliably elevate the interests of the states over the federal
government.197 To the contrary, as the Supremacy Clause demonstrates, the
Constitution also explicitly favors federal interests above states’ interests.198
Thus, Manning may well be correct that the Constitution represents a
compromise when it comes to issues of separation of powers and federalism.
But the Constitution does not express similar ambivalence about individual
liberty or the rights of criminal defendants. To the contrary, the document
overwhelmingly seeks to protect liberty and criminal defendants. Courts
should, thus, construe statutes “in the direction of constitutional policy.”199
That the Constitution clearly embodies values of individual liberty and
the protection of criminal defendants from state power is not the only reason
to adopt criminal clear statement rules. As others have noted, many of the
existing clear statement rules “protect structural or institutional
constitutional norms.”200 We are often told that structural and institutional
rights, such as federalism and the separation of powers, are important
because they protect individual liberty from government power.201 If the
courts are using clear statement rules to protect structural rights because
those structural rights indirectly provide protection to individual liberty,
then it should be entirely uncontroversial to use clear statement rules to
protect liberty directly.
193. Manning, supra note 134, at 428–32; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[T]he Framers did not
require—and indeed rejected—the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate and
distinct.”).
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
197. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819) (stating that “the
American people . . . did not design to make their government dependent on the States”).
198. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
199. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944).
200. Garrett, supra note 135, at 74.
201. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
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Of course, to say that the Constitution embodies values of individual
liberty does not tell us how to operationalize those values and principles in
clear statement rules. A general clear statement rule to protect individual
liberty would not be meaningfully different than the rule of lenity—at least
the rule of lenity as it was originally formulated and employed. Instead,
criminal clear statement rules must identify particular issues about which
legislatures must speak clearly. This is no different than the current clear
statement rules that protect federalism and the separation of powers. There
is no general federalism clear statement rule, but rather a series of specific
rules, such as the rule against congressional waiver of states’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, and the rule against
congressional regulation of core state functions.202 When interpreting
federal statutes that affect the states, courts use these specific clear statement
rules in order to preserve the balance of state and federal power.
Specific criminal clear statement rules could be derived from a number
of sources. They could be derived from explicit constitutional guarantees.
Of course, courts must already protect the values embodied in explicit
constitutional guarantees: if a statute runs afoul of the text of the
Constitution (or the courts’ doctrine interpreting that text), then courts will
strike down the legislation. Constitutionally-derived clear statement rules
would sweep more broadly than the text or the doctrine. They would protect
a broader class of individuals or a broader course of conduct than what the
Constitution explicitly protects. That is to say, criminal clear statement rules
would create a zone-of-interest around various constitutional rights,203 and
they would require legislators to speak clearly if they intend to encroach on
that zone-of-interest.204
For example, the courts could create a clear statement rule that protects
juveniles from harsh penalties based on the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Current Eighth Amendment
doctrine shields persons under eighteen from capital punishment and from
202. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (requiring a clear statement authorizing
congressional regulation of core state functions); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985) (requiring a clear congressional waiver of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit).
203. Anthony Amsterdam has suggested that the Court has used the void-for-vagueness doctrine
to create zones of interest around certain individual rights during certain periods of time. Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75–
80 (1960).
204. To be clear, we are not advocating for an expansion of constitutional rights themselves. Clear
statement rules are different than, say, penumbras. See Young, supra note 130, at 1591–93
(distinguishing substantive canons from penumbras). Clear statement rules do not expand the reach of
the Constitution. While they make it more difficult for legislatures to act on issues that come close to,
but do not violate, constitutional rights, clear statement rules do not prohibit legislatures from taking
such actions.
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life-without-parole sentences in some circumstances.205 A clear statement
rule could extend that constitutional protection by making mandatory
minimum penalties inapplicable to defendants under the age of eighteen,
unless the legislature clearly states otherwise. In its Eighth Amendment
cases, the Supreme Court noted that harsh penalties often apply to
individuals under the age of eighteen only because of how statutory schemes
have been drafted, not because legislators specifically decided to subject
minors to those penalties.206 The hypothetical clear statement rule would
require legislatures to specifically state that mandatory minimum penalties
apply to those under eighteen, even if those defendants are being tried as
adults.
Importantly, the individual rights enshrined in the text of the Constitution
should not be the only basis for criminal clear statement rules.207 In creating
federalism clear statement rules and separation of powers clear statement
rules, the courts have not limited themselves to the text of the Constitution.
They have also looked to tradition and historical practice. For example, the
Court has developed a presumption against divesting the judiciary of its
traditional equity power.208 This presumption was not derived from specific
text in the Constitution, but rather from practice and the vague reference to
“judicial power” in Article III.209
The language in the Due Process Clause similarly supports the use of the
common law and historical practice as bases for clear statement rules. The
Due Process Clause is understood to protect “principle[s] of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”210 Common-law-based clear statement rules can also be
based on the long tradition of construing statutes against the backdrop of the
common law.211
205. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012);
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
206. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 66–67 (recognizing that harsh penalties applying to
individuals under the age of eighteen appear to be unintended byproducts of statutory schemes rather
than the intended consequences of legislative action).
207. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 130, at 946 (“This notion of giving what might be called subconstitutional or extra-constitutional protection to certain rights and interests has long had a pervasive
impact on the thinking of judges.”).
208. E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991).
209. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 605, 607–08.
210. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934)); see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952).
211. E.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (“It is a well-established rule of
construction that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate
the established meaning of these terms.’” (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318,
322 (1992))); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that “where
a common-law principle is well established, . . . the courts may take it as given that Congress has
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The courts have a long history of reading the Due Process Clause in this
fashion. For example, neither the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
nor the requirement that the government bear that burden appear in the text
of the Constitution. And yet the courts have not permitted the states to do
away with these protections.212 The Court will forbid the states from taking
an action that “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”213
But the Supreme Court has been hesitant to incorporate many common
law principles via the Due Process Clause. It has characterized the showing
that a principle is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental” as a heavy burden.214 And it has stated that
due process requires that only the most basic safeguards be observed.215 This
hesitance stems, at least in part, from the Court’s unwillingness to remove
the ability of legislatures to experiment with other criminal justice rules and
procedures.216 As a consequence, there are many common law principles
with deep historical roots that have not been employed to cabin legislative
dysfunction. Criminal clear statement rules would allow the courts to
vindicate those principles without completely removing the ability of
legislatures to experiment and set other criminal justice priorities.
Legislatures would have to speak clearly and affirmatively if they wanted
to act counter to those principles, but they would retain the power to do so.
2. Justifying Criminal Clear Statement Rules
An obvious reason to adopt criminal clear statement rules is that they
would provide a counterweight to the legislative dysfunction associated
with modern criminal law. As we explain in Part I, legislatures often
respond to well-publicized crimes with hastily written criminal legislation.
That legislation often fails to clarify important questions, such as the
required mental state, and it often sweeps more broadly to include more
conduct than the situation would appear to warrant. As a result, our criminal
legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply”); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (“[W]here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known
meaning at common law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in that
sense . . . .”); see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 76 (2d ed.
1858) (stating that “we are to construe statutes according to the rules and reasons of the common law”).
212. E.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
213. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 523 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
214. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748–49 (2006) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 202 (1977)).
215. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210.
216. See id. at 207–08 (noting that the challenged law was part of a revision undertaken by the
state to make its criminal code less draconian).
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codes are littered with ambiguous and overly broad criminal laws. And,
because our system relies so heavily on prosecutorial discretion, legislators
can shift the blame for any unpopular prosecution, rather than being held
responsible for their failure to write an appropriately specific and narrow
statute in the first instance.
Criminal clear statement rules could counteract some of these tendencies.
They would force legislatures to address explicitly the issues that are subject
to clear statement rules.217 If legislatures failed to specifically address an
issue associated with a clear statement rule, then that issue would be
resolved in favor of the more narrow, liberty-enhancing construction. And
if legislators did explicitly address the issue, and if they opted for a statute
that is less protective of liberty, then they would have to deal with the
political ramifications associated with that decision.
Clear statement rules are likely to be particularly effective at protecting
otherwise sympathetic defendants or conduct. Take, for example, the recent
changes that Congress made to federal child pornography laws.218 Some
protested that the new statute did not exempt minors from the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum penalty, and thus the statute could be triggered by a
teenager who attempted to send a sexually explicit photo of him- or herself
to a peer.219 Legislators did not bother to defend the application of such a
penalty to minors; instead they simply ignored the concern and voted for the
generally applicable language.
Now imagine that the juvenile clear statement rule— that mandatory
minimum penalties do not apply to juveniles, even if being tried as adults—
had been in effect.220 Courts would interpret Congress’s failure to address
juveniles in the statute as excluding everyone under eighteen from those
penalties. If members of Congress had wanted to overcome that clear
statement rule, its proponents would have to explicitly endorse an
application of the law’s harsh penalties to juveniles, forcing them to grapple
with the fact that the law could be used to prosecute the very children it was
supposed to protect.221 One suspects that many legislators would not have
been willing to vote in favor of language that specifically targeted minors.
217. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (stating that a clear statement rule “ensures that certain
sensitive decisions are made explicitly and transparently by the most democratically accountable branch,
the legislature”).
218. Protecting Against Child Exploitation Act of 2017, H.R. 1761, 115th Cong. (2017).
219. See Janet Burns, House Passes Bill That Could Have Teens Facing 15 Years for Trying to
Sext, FORBES (June 2, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/06/02/house-pa
sses-bill-that-could-jail-teens-15-years-for-sexting/#69e501b04cf6 [https://perma.cc/J237-BHMX].
220. See supra text accompanying notes 205–206.
221. At present, most jurisdictions do not exempt minors from their child pornography laws. See
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law,
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 5, 27–28 (2013).
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Minors are a sympathetic group, and so there are political costs of treating
young people harshly. Lawmakers who affirmatively wanted to impose
those mandatory minimum penalties on minors would have to expend
political capital to obtain majority support for legislation that explicitly
punished the very group it was designed to protect.
One might object to criminal clear statement rules on the grounds that
determining the content of the criminal laws is a legislative, rather than a
judicial, power.222 But the fact that legislatures have the power to determine
the content of criminal laws does not tell us criminal clear statement rules
are inappropriate. Indeed, the argument that judges must be careful not to
encroach on the power of the legislature to write the laws ignores the long
history—both in this country and in England—of judges taking an active
role in interpreting criminal laws.223 Until relatively recently, judges were
widely understood to have a significant role to play in shaping the content
of the criminal law.224 The mere fact that the legislature had enacted a
criminal statute did not settle the scope of criminal law.225 Instead, judges
saw their role as reining in legislatures when their statutes departed too far
from the criminal common law.226
History also contains multiple examples of courts narrowing criminal
liability in response to excessively punitive behavior by other criminal
justice actors. For example, the rule of lenity grew out of the extremely
harsh laws of seventeenth-century England.227 Because so many felony
offenses carried an automatic sentence of death, judges adopted the
“practice of construing all penal statutes as strictly as possible to avoid
hanging those who did not deserve it.”228 The benefit of clergy provides a
similar example. The benefit of clergy was “[o]riginally introduced to keep
the royal courts from exercising jurisdiction over clerics charged with

222. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts should
define criminal activity.”); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ( “[T]he plain
principle [is] that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It
is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”).
223. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1005, 1008–09, 1024–25
(2001).
224. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 979–81.
225. E.g., BISHOP, supra note 211, §§ 91, 114 (discussing how to interpret overlapping statutes
and statutes “in derogation of common law”).
226. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748,
754–56 (1935); see generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383
(1908).
227. Hall, supra note 226, at 749–51; Solan, supra note 64, at 87.
228. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 755.
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crime.”229 But the benefit of clergy was subsequently extended to people
outside of the church as a “device to ameliorate the rigors of a harsh paper
criminal code,”230 and it eventually “evolved into a rule of lenity for all firsttime felony offenders.”231 In short, judges have, until recently, been active
participants in shaping the content of criminal law and limiting overly
punitive tendencies of other government officials.
In any event, clear statement rules do not actually limit legislative
power—they simply require legislatures to focus on particular issues and
make extra efforts to state their intent.232 To be sure, courts can use clear
statement rules to make the exercise of legislative power more difficult
when that power is in tension with other important constitutional values.
Crafting laws that contain clear statements takes time and effort. That is why
some have referred to clear statement rules as exacting a “clarity tax” from
lawmakers.233 As the clarity tax moniker indicates, clear statement rules
make it more costly for legislatures to achieve certain ends. That increased
cost is likely to result in fewer laws that encroach on important
constitutional values.234 But clear statement rules do not actually prevent
legislatures from enacting such laws.
Importantly, in assessing whether clear statement rules provide an
appropriate balance of power between the legislature and the courts, we
should not lose sight of how much the legislature has failed in its
responsibility to write the criminal laws. When people say that it is the job
of the legislature to write the criminal law, that argument conjures up the
image of lawmakers writing discrete, clearly-worded criminal statutes.235
But, as we explained in Part I, that is not the case. Instead, legislatures often
have passed overly broad and imprecise statutes.
229. Richard B. Morris, Benefit of Clergy in America and Related Matters, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
436, 436 (1957) (book review); see also Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm
Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1099, 1122–26 (tracing the benefit of clergy to the
backlash following the murder of Archbishop Thomas Becket during the reign of Henry II).
230. Morris, supra note 229, at 436.
231. Hamilton, supra note 229, at 1123; see also Solan, supra note 64, at 87.
232. Garrett, supra note 135, at 73.
233. Manning, supra note 134, at 425–27; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public
Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118
YALE L.J. 2, 11–16, 40 (2008).
234. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 73 (noting that “the amount of legislation intruding on areas
of constitutional concern should decline” when clear statement rules are employed). More generally,
there is evidence that rules which create defaults, but do not otherwise constrain choices, are very
effective in changing behavior. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
5 (2013) (“For retirement savings, automatic enrollment appears to have a far larger effect than even
substantial tax incentives . . . .”).
235. Hessick, supra note 1, at 992–93 (“When we speak of criminal statutes, we often assume that
the statute is written in specific rather than general terms, and we also assume that the statutes are written
to target only particular harmful behavior.”).
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As these overly broad and imprecise laws illustrate, the
countermajoritarian critique of clear statement rules applies with less force
in the context of criminal laws. The countermajoritarian critique “treats as
uncontroversial the ‘democratic’ character of the legislative process as
currently constituted. In other words, once a statute is enacted and comes to
the court for interpretation, the democratic pedigree of the legislative
process that produced the statute goes unchallenged and unscrutinized.”236
But there are many reasons to challenge the “democratic pedigree” of
criminal laws. Legislatures fail to do the hard work associated with crafting
clearly and narrowly worded statutes that balance the need for public safety
and the need to protect liberty. Instead, they leave it to prosecutors (and, to
a lesser extent, judges) to determine what is legal or illegal.237
Criminal clear statement rules would help society deal with these
imprecise and overly broad statutes. They would give notice to both citizens
and the legislature as to how imprecise statutes would be interpreted.
Individuals who might otherwise have to decide whether to risk having an
imprecise statute interpreted against them will be able to rely on clear
language (or the absence thereof) in determining whether their conduct falls
within a statute. Clear statement rules would also provide legislatures with
better information about what is required to achieve a certain result. If
legislators know that a statute will be interpreted in a particular fashion
unless they say otherwise, they will be able to make better ex ante decisions
about what language to choose in order to criminalize certain types of
behavior.238
Criminal clear statement rules would provide more certainty and
predictability than the rule of lenity or the vagueness doctrine—both in
terms of when they apply and in terms of how a judge will interpret a statute.
Lenity and vagueness have been inconsistently applied because it is unclear
when a statute is sufficiently ambiguous or sufficiently vague for the
doctrines to apply.239 In contrast, clear statement rules have a well-defined
trigger—the clear statement rule flags a particular issue, such as whether a
mandatory minimum penalty applies to juveniles. And unlike the rule of
lenity—which tells judges only that they must construe an ambiguous

236. Schacter, supra note 117, at 597.
237. One might argue that prosecutors are better situated to vindicate democratic accountability
concerns than are judges. But that argument neglects two important facts—namely that most judges are
elected and that prosecutorial decisions are rarely transparent. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 1001–06.
238. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994) (justifying a clear statement rule
against retroactive application of civil statutes because it “has the additional virtue of giving legislators
a predictable background rule against which to legislate”).
239. See supra notes 72–74, 99–105 and accompanying text.
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statute in the defendant’s favor—clear statement rules dictate more
precisely how the judge will interpret the statute.
Because clear statement rules can be applied in a straightforward fashion,
they not only provide more guidance for legislators and the general public,
but they are also less likely to trigger complaints about judges usurping the
legislative role. That is because, unlike lenity and vagueness, there will be
less doubt about what a legislature must do to satisfy a clear statement rule.
Language is inherently ambiguous,240 and when courts have rejected
vagueness challenges they have sometimes done so on the theory that the
legislature could not draft a specific statute that was sufficiently
comprehensive to cover every inevitability.241 In contrast, clear statement
rules identify the particular issues about which legislatures must speak
clearly.
More generally, clear statement rules could help to ease political pressure
on judges. Judges often face political pressure not to issue defense-friendly
interpretations of statutes. That pressure is especially intense for elected
judges.242 Clear statement rules might relieve some of that political pressure.
For example, clear statement rules could disrupt the common complaint that
a judge’s pro-defense ruling allowed a dangerous criminal to “go free.”243
Clear statement rules allow judges to place those decisions at the feet of the
legislature. That is, a judicial opinion could explain that legislators were on
notice and, if they wanted to intrude upon this particular constitutional
principle or historical value, then they needed to do so explicitly and
unambiguously. In this way, clear statement rules would “stop the buck”
where it belongs—at the legislature.244
This buck-stopping feature of criminal clear statement rules could
forestall charges of judicial activism.245 At present, legislatures are cast as
the sole appropriate decisionmaker in substantive criminal law;246 and any
effort by judges to intrude upon the substance of criminal law is decried as
240. See Ernst Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437, 438 (1921)
(“Every common abstraction has its ‘marginal’ ambiguity, which mere elaboration of definition cannot
altogether remove.”).
241. Cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (noting that “most statutes are
ambiguous to some degree”).
242. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
243. Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (limiting the scope of the exclusionary
rule because its application would “let[] guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free—something
that ‘offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 908 (1984))).
244. It is for this reason that Cass Sunstein has described clear statement rules as serving
nondelegation purposes. Sunstein, supra note 130, at 337–40.
245. Cf. Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (noting the possibility that clear statement rules
“effectively” allow courts “to strike down legislation without appearing to be activist”).
246. See supra notes 117 and 229 and accompanying text.
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activism.247 Criminal clear statement rules would re-cast judges in the role
of protectors of individual rights and constitutional guarantees—a role that
the courts already play in other areas of the law. Judges could use their
opinions as an opportunity to explain why the particular principle or value
is so important, and thus why it is important to protect that principle or value
unless the legislature decides otherwise.248 Because the legislature is still
free to make a contrary decision, the court can credibly claim that its
decision is not thwarting the majority’s will. To the contrary, clear statement
rules ensure that legislatures are making important policy decisions because
they minimize that possibility that the judge is allowing her policy
preferences to shape the interpretation of less-than-clear statutory text.249
Indeed, a judge could go so far as to claim that the absence of a clear
statement about the issue was an indication from the legislature that it
wanted to protect liberty or rights in this situation because the legislature
itself was on notice as to how the statute would be interpreted.250
What is more, because clear statement rules also serve as external
constraints on judicial preferences, criticisms that judges are simply
indulging their own policy preferences will have less force.251 Put
differently, clear statement rules require judges to issue certain rulings
unless the legislature explicitly and unambiguously says otherwise.
Therefore, we cannot say that a judge whose ruling is based on a clear
statement rule is using her interpretive discretion to achieve some hidden
goal because the clear statement rule restricts judicial discretion.252

247. See, e.g., People v. Flores, 227 174 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 392 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (refusing to
find a certain statute to be impermissibly vague because it “would ‘overrule’ the voters and be the height
of judicial activism” and because “[w]e do not sit as a ‘super Legislature’”); James J. Brudney &
Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and
Roberts Eras, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 490 (2013) (positing that the Justices’ increasing reliance
on dictionaries in statutory interpretation “may well reflect the Court’s search for an oasis from which
to deflect or rebut charges of judicial activism”).
248. In contrast, the rule of lenity and the vagueness doctrine only give judges an opening to speak
about the due process principles that underlie those doctrines—principles that are relatively abstract and
often ignored. See Hessick, supra note 15 (documenting how due process principles are routinely
ignored in the modern criminal justice system).
249. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994) (stating that the clear statement
rule against retroactive application of civil legislation “allocates to Congress responsibility for
fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes”).
250. “If lawmakers know that precise textual language is required . . . the absence of such language
sends a strong signal about the correct meaning of the text.” Garrett, supra note 135, at 75.
251. That is not to say that judges have not faced criticism for developing clear statement rules,
or that clear statement rules cannot be the product of judicial policy preferences. But the application of
existing clear statement rules are less open to such criticisms.
252. Cf. Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at 859–64 (documenting that most Supreme Court
Justices appear to use substantive canons to arrive at results that are not consistent with their political
ideology).
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To be sure, some might argue that judges are acting according to their
own policy preferences in those cases where a clear statement rule is
initially adopted.253 In such cases the judges’ discretion is not yet restricted.
But even in those cases, charges that judges are acting to vindicate their own
policy preferences are not likely to be as strong as in cases where they
interpret cases without clear statement rules. That is because adopting a
clear statement rule limits judicial discretion in future cases. The judges do
not know what their policy preferences will be in those future cases, and so
they are likely to be more circumspect about adopting clear statement rules
that will govern them going forward. Indeed, that is why some opponents
of broad judicial discretion have advocated that judges adopt more brightline rules—because those rules reduce judicial discretion in future cases.254
3. Criminal Clear Statement Rules in Practice
Before turning to a detailed discussion of our two specific criminal clear
statement rules, a few words are in order about how criminal clear statement
rules would operate, as a general matter, in practice. In particular, we want
to address how legislatures might satisfy clear statement rules, as well as
the question of retroactivity.
Courts should permit legislatures to overcome criminal clear statement
rules only on a statute-by-statute basis. Legislatures should not be permitted
to overcome a clear statement rule by a legislative enactment that applies to
the entire penal code or to entire sections of the code.255 So, for example, a
legislature could not satisfy a clear statement rule about juveniles and
mandatory minimum penalties by enacting a single, generally-applicable
statute that says “all mandatory minimum sentences in the penal code apply
to juvenile defendants who are tried as adults.” If legislatures were
permitted to satisfy a clear statement rule through such a general statute,
then many benefits associated with clear statement rules would be lost. That
253. This assumes that judges will acknowledge when they are adopting a new rule. But they often
obfuscate this fact. See infra note 258.
254. E.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–79
(1989).
255. For example, the Arizona legislature has attempted to abrogate the rule of lenity through
generally applicable statutes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-211(C) (2019) (“The rule of the common
law that penal statutes shall be strictly construed has no application to these Revised Statutes. Penal
statutes shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a view to effect their object
and to promote justice.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-104 (2019) (“The general rule that a penal statute
is to be strictly construed does not apply to this title, but the provisions herein must be construed
according to the fair meaning of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law . . . .”).
But the courts have—in our view, correctly—continued to employ the rule of lenity in at least some
cases. See, e.g., Cawley v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 701 P.2d 1195, 1196 n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744, 748–49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
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is because the clear statement rule would no longer require legislatures to
pay the “clarity tax” and internalize the political costs of their clear
statement with each new piece of legislation.256 Nor would it be clear
whether future legislators actually intended the general rule to apply,
because they would not be required to confront and decide the issue each
time that they enacted a new law with a mandatory minimum penalty.257
Some might think that clear statement rules will not serve as a
particularly onerous clarity tax because legislatures could develop stock
phrases to routinely insert into new criminal legislation. Once a stock phrase
had been developed, inserting a stock phrase might not require that a
legislator spend much time to overcome a clear statement rule when passing
a new criminal law. But, as our example of the juvenile punishment clear
statement rule illustrates, there may still be political costs because
legislators would still have to endorse applying harsh penalties to juveniles.
Also, because we expect criminal clear statement rules to change how
many statutes are interpreted, we feel compelled to offer an opinion about
whether these interpretive rules ought to apply retroactively. In short, the
answer is “yes.” When a court adopts a new clear statement rule that protects
a particular criminal law value, it ought to apply that clear statement rule to
all criminal statutes—including criminal statutes that were enacted before
the court first announced the rule.
To be clear, the question of retroactivity presents challenges for all clear
statement rules; it is not unique to criminal clear statement rules. In the
context of non-criminal clear statement rules, the courts have largely
dodged this question, rather than addressed it head-on. In particular, they
ordinarily fail to acknowledge when they are announcing a new clear
statement rule; instead they suggest that the rule predates the decision.258
Some might argue against retroactivity based on the idea of dialogue
between the courts and the legislature.259 A clear statement rule places the
legislature on notice that it must make an unambiguous, affirmative
256. See supra notes 219–221, 232–234 and accompanying text.
257. The problems associated with individuals whose decisions at T1 will bind subsequent actors
at T2 is hardly limited to legislatures. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity:
Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 719–20 (2018) (identifying
problems associated with “intertemporal externalit[ies]”).
258. Take, for example, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), which is
generally thought to be the case that first adopted the modern clear statement rule regarding
congressional waiver of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. See Note, Clear Statement
Rules, supra note 135, at 1962 (identifying Atascadero as the case that “has formed the basis of the
Court’s adoption of clear statement rules”). The majority opinion did not explicitly acknowledge that it
was, for the first time, requiring a clear statement from Congress. Instead, it characterized its holding as
“consistent with” a number of previous cases, and it insisted that the “adoption of the dissent’s position
would require us to overrule numerous decisions of this Court.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 & n.3.
259. See supra note 19.
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statement to accomplish a certain end. Before a clear statement rule is
announced, the legislature is not on notice about the form that its legislation
has to take. Thus, so the argument goes, it is inappropriate to apply these
rules retroactively.
We do not find the dialogue argument against retroactivity persuasive.
The idea that judges ought to give notice seems attractive, but it does not
hold up under closer scrutiny. Although it has long been thought that
legislatures must give notice of any rule change before using that rule, this
limitation is largely limited to rules that burden private rights.260 An
interpretive rule aimed at legislatures is not a rule aimed at private rights. In
addition, the same notice limitations do not apply to judges.261 That is why,
for example, when a court interprets a statute for the first time, that
interpretation nonetheless applies to the defendant in the case before it.262
More generally, when courts have shifted interpretive methodologies,
they have not let the lack of notice to legislatures stop them. Take, for
example, the relatively recent shift to textualism. Before courts embraced
textualism, they would often seek to construe statutes in a way that would
best further legislative purpose.263 As a result, legislators were probably less
careful about the precise text of a statute; they knew that if the legislative
history of a statute made their purpose clear, courts would endeavor to
construe the statute in a way that was compatible with that purpose. But
textualists do not interpret statutes in light of the legislative purpose; they
interpret based on the text.264 And, as a result, textualists may never consider
the committee reports, floor speeches, or legislative history that those
legislators assumed would be part of any future litigation over the meaning
of the statute. Textualists routinely interpret statutes that were enacted long
before the rise of textualism. Yet, textualists have not limited their
methodology to only statutes enacted after legislators were on notice that
these other legislative materials would not be considered to interpret the
text.
260. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994) (“Since the early days of
this Court, we have declined to give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights unless
Congress had made clear its intent. . . . The presumption against statutory retroactivity has consistently
been explained by reference to the unfairness of imposing new burdens on persons after the fact.”).
261. See Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in American Law, 62 AM.
J. COMP. L. 37, 38 (2014) (“The strong presumption is that statements of law in judgments that announce
new rules or overturn old ones apply to conduct predating that judgment.”).
262. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 462 (2001). It is only when a judicial interpretation
was “unforeseeable,” that courts will find that interpretations can implicate “the right to fair warning.”
Id. at 457.
263. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
71–73 (2006).
264. Id. at 73–75.
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As the textualism example illustrates, the idea that judges and legislators
are engaged in a dialogue when it comes to statutory interpretation might be
best understood as a legal fiction.265 To be clear, there is evidence that those
who draft statutes are familiar with interpretive rules, and that those rules
may affect how statutes are drafted.266 But that does not mean that judges
have constrained (or should constrain) themselves when interpreting
statutes that pre-date a shift in their interpretive rules. That may explain why
retroactivity concerns have not diverted the courts from using clear
statement rules that vindicate non-criminal law values.
Nonetheless, the retroactivity question might give us greater pause in the
context of criminal statutes. That is because a more narrow interpretation of
a criminal statute under a clear statement rule could result in the release of
people from prison who were convicted under that statute. In this respect,
we have to decide whether clear statement rules would apply retroactively
to individual defendants, rather than to individual statutes. Again, we think
that they should.
As a general matter, when courts construe a statute, the legal fiction is
that they are simply declaring what the law always meant rather than
changing the meaning of the statute going forward.267 As a consequence,
when the Supreme Court has issued a definitive interpretation of a federal
criminal statute that narrows the scope of the statute, lower courts will apply
that more narrow interpretation on collateral review. 268 That is to say, even
if a defendant’s conviction has already become final, she can file a habeas
corpus petition to argue that her conduct did not fall within the statute as
newly interpreted by the courts.269

265. Lon Fuller famously defined a “legal fiction” as “either (1) a statement propounded with a
complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility.”
LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967). But we are employing the term in a slightly different manner
to mean what Peter Smith has deemed a “new legal fiction,” namely, “crafting a legal rule on a factual
premise that is false or inaccurate.” Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007).
266. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725
(2014); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901
(2013).
267. E.g., In re McIntire, 936 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Mass. 2010) (“Where a decision does not
announce new common-law rules or rights but rather construes a statute, no analysis of retroactive or
prospective effect is required because at issue is the meaning of the statute since its enactment.”).
268. See, e.g., Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s
Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 63 n.43 (2015)
(collecting sources).
269. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619–21 (1998) (explaining why a defendant who
pleaded guilty prior to the Court’s narrowing interpretation of a federal statute was not barred by Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), from challenging the guilty plea on collateral attack).
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Some might argue that this individual retroactivity counsels against
adopting criminal clear statement rules because post-conviction claims by
defendants could lead to the release of dangerous defendants. But we are
not convinced that this should deter courts from adopting criminal clear
statement rules. That is because we believe that the benefits of clear
statement rules outweigh the costs of retroactive application.270 In
particular, we do not believe that many defendants will actually be released
from prison if these clear statement rules were applied retroactively, and the
most dangerous offenders are the least likely to be released.
There are at least three reasons why the number of people affected is
likely to be small. First, legislatures are likely to act quickly if they want to
overcome clear statement rules. Criminal legislation is popular, and the
legislative process is less balanced than in other areas.271 If a statute is
construed narrowly under a clear statement rule, legislatures are likely to
react quickly. As a result, the retroactivity problem is not likely to persist
for very long—at least not for those statutes where there is a true legislative
consensus in favor of a broader or harsher statute.
Second, there must be a specific ruling involving the particular statute in
order for that decision to apply retroactively to other defendants convicted
under the same statute.272 Even if one defendant obtained a narrowing
interpretation of a statute, other defendants who have been convicted under
that same statute may serve their entire sentence (or a significant portion
thereof) before they would be able to navigate the collateral review process
and obtain release.273 And, in the meantime, the legislature can enact a
revised statute that includes a clear statement, which would apply to any
future defendants.
Third, even those defendants who were convicted under laws that were
subsequently narrowed by clear statement rules will not necessarily be
270. That is not to say that we think, as a general matter, courts ought to be deterred from adopting
new criminal law doctrines out of concern that too many defendants would benefit from those doctrines.
But, even assuming that were an appropriate consideration, we think that the costs of retroactive
application of clear statement rules are overstated.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 23–41.
272. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), (f)(3) (2012).
273. As Eve Brensike Primus has noted:
[M]ost defendants have served their full sentences by the time they reach the collateral review
stage. Under the current system, only defendants sentenced to more than four or five years in
prison have an incentive to challenge their convictions on collateral review, because it takes
that long to exhaust the appellate process in many jurisdictions. In fact, inmates in many state
jurisdictions may work off as much as a third of their sentences by earning “good time” credit.
In these states, only those defendants sentenced to six or more years in prison would still be
incarcerated after completing the appellate process.
Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 693 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
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released. That is because the defendant will have to prove not only that she
was convicted under an incorrectly broad reading of the statute, but also that
she is factually innocent of the charges.274 In rebutting that claim, the
government is not limited to the existing record, but can present any
admissible evidence.275
Even if the defendant would no longer qualify for conviction under that
particular statute, that does not mean she will necessarily be released from
jail. That is because the people serving lengthy sentences for serious
crimes—i.e., those people who would most likely benefit from criminal
clear statement rules276—are likely guilty of some other crime for which
they could be convicted. For example, many states allow a defendant to be
convicted of murder even if she did not intend to bring about the death of
another; it is enough that the defendant acted recklessly and with a disregard
for the sanctity of human life, and in so doing, caused the death of another.
Some states permit such a conviction explicitly in their statutes, while others
have allowed such convictions as a matter of judicial interpretation.277 If a
court were to adopt the mens rea clear statement rule that we propose below,
then defendants convicted of depraved heart murder in the absence of a
statute would no longer be guilty of murder, though they would still be
guilty of a lesser homicide offense. The state would be free to retry them on
those other, lesser-included charges, such as manslaughter.278 And if
legislatures wanted to continue to treat such people as murderers, they could
write a statute that does so explicitly.
*

*

*

In sum, criminal clear statement rules can help ameliorate legislative
dysfunction. And they can do so while maintaining an appropriate balance
of power between the courts and the legislative branch and providing
political insulation for judges’ decisions.

274. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623–24.
275. Id. at 624.
276. See supra note 273.
277. E.g., State v. Woodall, 744 P.2d 732, 734–35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Sarun Chun,
203 P.3d 425, 433 (Cal. 2009); State v. Clark, 931 P.2d 664, 671 (Kan. 1997); DeBettencourt v. State,
428 A.2d 479, 530 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Windham v. State, 602 So. 2d 798, 801–02 (Miss. 1992);
State v. Mosley, 806 S.E.2d 365, 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017); State v. Draves, 524 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Or.
Ct. App. 1974). Our clear statement rule would matter only in those jurisdictions that have not adopted
depraved heart murder via statute.
278. It is possible that the statute of limitations may have run out on lesser-included charges. In
that situation, the government may be limited to bringing other charges that they decided not to bring in
exchange for a defendant’s guilty plea. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 624.
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III. EXAMPLES OF CRIMINAL CLEAR STATEMENT RULES
The primary purpose of this Article is to identify criminal clear statement
rules as an important doctrinal tool to combat the legislative dysfunction
surrounding criminal laws. But we have also chosen to propose two
particular clear statement rules. We have done this to give a clearer sense of
what a criminal clear statement rule would look like, how such a rule could
be justified, and how such a rule would operate in practice. To be sure, we
believe that courts ought to adopt the particular criminal clear statement
rules we propose. But it is not necessary to accept these particular rules in
order to accept the broader idea of criminal clear statement rules.
The first clear statement rule we propose involves mental states: we
propose that courts read all criminal statutes as requiring a knowing mental
state for every material element. The second clear statement rule involves
the harm that the defendant caused or intended: we propose that a defendant
must have caused or intended to cause substantial harm in order for her
conduct to fall within the scope of a criminal statute. Both of our clear
statement rules are limited to the interpretation of felony statutes. And, as
with all clear statement rules, they can be overcome by an affirmative and
unambiguous statement by the legislature.
Out of many potential clear statement rules, we have chosen these two
particular clear statement rules for specific reasons. First, we deliberately
chose one rule that is relatively radical and one rule that is quite tame. The
substantial harm rule—though supported by both history and policy—is
likely to strike readers as a dramatic departure from current doctrine. The
mens rea rule, in contrast, represents only a minor departure from current
doctrine; the Supreme Court has, on occasion, flirted with adopting a similar
clear statement rule.279 Second, we deliberately chose one rule that
addressed a problem associated with imprecise statutes (the mens rea rule)
and one rule that addressed a problem with overly broad statutes (the
substantial harm rule). Of course these proposed rules do not address all of
the problems associated with imprecise statutes or overly broad statutes. But
they do address problems that have resulted in repeated litigation and
doctrinal confusion.
A. Mens Rea Clear Statement Rule
Nowhere is the need for clear statement rules greater than in the area of
mens rea. Legislative efforts to address confusion surrounding mental states
have failed. Many modern cases of criminal statutory interpretation involve
279.

See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618–19; see also discussion infra notes 293–296.
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disputes about required mental states. The current doctrine surrounding
mens rea is confusing and unpredictable. A criminal clear statement rule
that specifies a default mental state and applies that mental state to all
elements of a crime could bring significant clarity and predictability to the
law.
Sometimes legislatures completely omit mental state terminology from
the definition of a crime. For example, imagine that a statute simply read “it
shall be a misdemeanor to come to class unprepared.” That statute omits any
mental state, and an interpreting court would have to decide whether to read
in a mental state requirement and, if so, what mental state requirement to
read in. A judge might require that a student know that she was unprepared.
Or, the judge might require only that the student be reckless or negligent as
to whether she was unprepared. Or, the judge might not require any mental
state, leaving the student strictly liable for appearing in class unprepared.
We refer to this statutory problem as an issue of omission.
Now, imagine that the statute reads that “it shall be a crime to knowingly
come to class unprepared when a student is on call.” This statute raises an
issue of modification. It is clear that the student must know that they are
coming to class. Most judges would assume that the crime also requires the
student to know that they are unprepared. The difficult modification issue
is whether the student must also know that they are on call that day. The
problem here is not one of omission, but rather one of modification—we do
not know to which elements the stated mental state is supposed to apply.
We propose one clear statement rule to deal with issues of omission and
issues of modification: absent a clear statement to the contrary, every
material element of a felony offense requires proof of a knowing mental
state. Under this rule a knowing mental state requirement would be applied
to all material elements of a statutory crime that omitted any mention of
mental state. Similarly, a knowing mental state requirement would be
applied in the case of an ambiguous modification issue.
One might say that the Supreme Court has long employed a de facto clear
statement rule with respect to the omission issue. The Court has long held
that it will not assume that Congress intended to omit a mental state
requirement simply from the fact that none was given in the text of the
statute.280 But there are exceptions to this general presumption, and those
exceptions are not very well delineated.
One exception is the public welfare offense doctrine. The standard
definition of a public welfare offense is a crime that is regulatory in nature,
280. E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
438 U.S. 422 (1978).
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addresses threats to public health, public safety, public morals, or public
order, and that carries a modest fine or short incarceration term.281 All public
welfare offenses are malum prohibitum as opposed to malum in se,282 but
not all malum prohibitum offenses are public welfare offenses.283 If a court
finds an offense to be a public welfare offense, it will not read in a mental
state. But the public welfare doctrine has become very confused because the
Court has struggled with how to treat dangerous regulated activities. In
some cases the Court reads in a mens rea requirement even where the
activity regulated is dangerous. But in other cases the Court refuses to read
traditional mens rea requirements into regulatory statutes dealing with
dangerous behavior.
Take, for example, the thinly-reasoned opinion in United States v.
Balint.284 There, the Court refused to read a mens rea requirement into a
narcotics statute that required tax stamps for certain types of drugs.
Dismissing the due process challenge largely out of hand, the Court
observed that the narcotics statute “merely uses a criminal penalty to secure
recorded evidence of the disposition of such drugs as a means of taxing and
restraining the traffic.”285 As such, the statute fell into a category of
regulatory measures whose “manifest purpose is to require every person
dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes
within the inhibition of the statute.”286
Balint muddles the traditional distinction between malum in se and
malum prohibitum offenses. The Balint Court characterized the narcotics
statute as “a taxing act with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread
of addiction to the use of poisonous and demoralizing drugs.”287 A taxation
crime seems to be a clear example of a malum prohibitum offense. The only
reason one should pay taxes is that the government prohibits failure to pay
them. In contrast, a vice statute aimed at restraining use of a “poisonous and
demoralizing drug” would seem to be malum in se; poisonous and
demoralizing substances sound like things that are themselves evil. Did the
Balint Court refuse to read in a mens rea requirement because the statute
was a mere regulatory measure that did not mark the offender as a serious
281. Darryl K. Brown, Public Welfare Offenses, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
862, 863 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014).
282. Id.
283. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (holding that criminal violations of
food stamp regulations are not strict liability offenses); U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437–38 (holding
that the Sherman Antitrust Act’s criminal provisions do not create strict liability).
284. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
285. Id. at 254.
286. Id. As is often the case when a court declares a legislative purpose to be “manifest,” the Court
cited no legislative history supporting its strict liability reading.
287. Id. at 253.
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criminal or because the statute was aimed at a dangerous social evil whose
violators deserved no quarter?
The Court subsequently tried to clarify the issue. In United States v.
Dotterweich, the Court stated that otherwise innocent people “in responsible
relation to a public danger” are subject to criminal liability in the interests
of the larger good.288 The strict liability that this “responsible relation to a
public danger” standard created was something that the criminal law had
long abhorred. And so, in Morissette v. United States, the Court tried to put
the strict liability genie back in the bottle and to label the bottle more
clearly.289 Morissette clearly stated that a traditional common law offense
such as theft or conversion cannot be a public welfare offense. The Court
also offered four factors that might indicate that a crime is a public welfare
offense: 1) the criminalization is not of an actual injury but the risk of injury;
2) a person could prevent the risk with relative ease; 3) the penalties are
small; and 4) there is little stigma associated with conviction.290
Unfortunately, these factors proved to be unreliable predictors of the
Court’s future decisions. Instead, subsequent cases strongly suggested that
the Court would not read in mental states to statutes that dealt with
dangerous substances, but would read them in if the subject matter of the
regulation was not dangerous.291 In those cases the Court justified not
288. 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). In order to reach this decision, however, the Dotterweich Court
had to read in not only a mental state, but also congressional intent to create criminal liability for both
the corporation and the corporation’s officers. Id. at 282–83.
In dissent, however, Justice Murphy raised serious questions about whether Congress had intended
any such thing. Murphy argued that courts should only find such individual criminal liability when the
intent to create it was clearly stated by Congress:
[I]n the absence of clear statutory authorization it is inconsistent with established canons of
criminal law to rest liability on an act in which the accused did not participate and of which he
had no personal knowledge. Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such
citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous.
Id. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy’s dissent in Dotterweich represents a path not taken
by the Court. Although he did not use the phrase “clear statement rules,” he argued that strict criminal
liability should be applied only when clearly stated by Congress. Id. at 292–93.
289. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil.”).
290. Id. at 256.
291. Compare United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609–10 (1971) (holding that because hand
grenades are highly dangerous offensive weapons no mental state was required with respect to the
registration element under the National Firearms Act), and United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1971) (holding that a statute making it a crime to “knowingly violate” any
of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s regulations for the transportation of corrosive liquids did not
require the defendant to have knowledge of those regulations because of the dangerous nature of the
materials shipped), with United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 US. 422, 445–46 (1978) (reading in an
intent requirement to criminal antitrust violations), and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433
(1985) (holding that violating food stamp regulations was not a public welfare offense because food
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applying any mental state requirement for an element of a crime on the
theory that the dangerousness of the activities being regulated should have
made the defendant aware of the relevant regulations.292
The Court came close to establishing a clear statement rule in Staples v.
United States.293 That case asked whether the defendant had to know that
his rifle was a machine gun in order to be guilty of violating the National
Firearms Act. Lower courts had split on the issue, and the trial court
instructed the jury that the defendant simply had to know that he possessed
a “dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of
regulation.”294 The Court held that, notwithstanding the dangerousness of
machine guns, the government had to prove that the defendant knew his
firearm was capable of fully automatic fire. The Court emphasized the
severity of the penalty involved—a possible ten year prison sentence—as
well as the stigma that any felony conviction carries.295
The Court came tantalizingly close to adopting a clear statement rule.
But it ultimately decided not to do so:
In this view, absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is
not required, we should not apply the public welfare offense rationale
to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as dispensing with
mens rea.
We need not adopt such a definitive rule of construction to decide
this case, however. Instead, we note only that where, as here,
dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have
knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a
further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to
eliminate a mens rea requirement. In such a case, the usual
presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his
conduct illegal should apply.296
Unfortunately, the rule that the Court announced in Staples is anything
stamps, unlike hand grenades or sulfuric acid, were neither dangerous nor subject to stringent
regulation).
292. Ironically and instructively for our purposes, in International Minerals the most relevant
piece of legislative history was generated in response to a request to Congress from the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) for a clearer statement of congressional intent. The ICC’s request for a
clear statement by Congress had been prompted by a circuit court decision holding that knowledge of
the regulations was required. Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 567–68 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing United
States v. Chi. Express, Inc., 235 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1956); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States,
220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955)).
293. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
294. Id. at 604.
295. Id. at 616.
296. Id. at 618–19 (citation omitted).
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but clear. Whether one is engaged in “traditionally lawful conduct”—as
opposed to the sort of conduct that would alert one to the likelihood of
government regulation—lies largely in the eye of the beholders.
In the wake of Staples, confusion has reigned about the scope of the
public welfare offense doctrine. Does the dangerousness of the offense
mean that no mental state is required, as was the case with the hand grenade
in Freed and the sulfuric acid in International Minerals?297 Or does the
possible innocence of a person facing felony conviction and prison mean
that a mental state must be read in, as was the case with the machine gun
owner in Staples?298
Statutes that impose harsher penalties on traditional crimes based on an
additional aggravating element pose similar modification problems.
Legislatures often leave the mental state requirements for the aggravating
elements ambiguous, and courts often engage in tortured logic to avoid
applying traditional mental state requirements to these additional elements.
United States v. Chin illustrates this problem.299 Chin was charged and
convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.300 He was also
charged with the separate federal offense of using a person under eighteen
years of age to avoid detection for a drug offense in violation of the Juvenile
297. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “first-degree burglary possession of a
dangerous weapon . . . is not ambiguous and does not include a mens rea requirement with respect to a
defendant’s possession of a dangerous weapon.” State v. Garcia-Gutierrez, 844 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Minn.
2014). In United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the D.C. Circuit held that a statute
that imposes a mandatory thirty-year sentence for any person who carries a machinegun while
committing a crime of violence “does not require the government to prove that a defendant knew that
the weapon he used, carried, or possessed was a machinegun.” Id. at 516. The Ninth Circuit held in
United States v. Jefferson, 791 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2015), that the government need not prove that the
defendant knew the specific type and quantity of the drugs he imported in order to trigger a ten-year
mandatory minimum under title 21 U.S.C. section 960(b)(1)(H). Id. at 1019.
298. The Minnesota Supreme Court held in In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn.
2000), that the “[State] was required to prove that [the juvenile] knew he possessed the knife on school
property as an element of the . . . offense charged.” Id. at 810 (emphasis added). The Nebraska Supreme
Court held in State v. Carman, 872 N.W.2d 559 (Neb. 2015), that “public welfare offenses such as traffic
infractions which do not contain the element of criminal intent cannot support convictions for
manslaughter.” Id. at 565. The California Supreme Court held in People v. King, 133 P.3d 636 (Cal.
2006), that a statute prohibiting possession of a variety of weapons was not a public welfare offense,
thus requiring that the prosecution prove the possessor’s knowledge of the weapon’s illegal
characteristics. Id. at 641. Similarly, the California Supreme Court held in In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297
(Cal. 2000), that a statute prohibiting the possession of an assault weapon was not intended to define a
strict liability offense and required either proof of either negligence or knowledge with respect to the
characteristics of the weapon. Id. at 299. The Second Circuit held in United States v. Bronx Reptiles,
Inc., 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000), that “the government was required to prove not only that the defendant
knowingly caused the transportation to the United States of a wild animal or bird, but also that the
defendant knew the conditions under which the animal or bird was transported were ‘inhumane or
unhealthful.’” Id. at 83.
299. 981 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
300. Id. at 1276.
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Drug Trafficking Act of 1986.301 The text of that statute makes it a crime to
“knowingly and intentionally . . . employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice,
or coerce, a person under eighteen years of age to assist in avoiding
detection or apprehension for any [listed federal drug offense] by any . . .
law enforcement official.”302 Despite the fact that the language clearly
required not just knowing but intentional conduct and the fact that both
adverbs preceded the age element, the D.C. Circuit followed three other
circuits in holding that a defendant did not have to know that the person
employed was a juvenile to be guilty of this separate crime.303
In an opinion written by then-circuit judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the
Chin court brushed aside the use of the phrase “knowingly and
intentionally” as “not a model of meticulous drafting.”304 Ginsburg asserted
that “[o]ne cannot tell from the words alone whether the person’s juvenile
status must be known and ‘intended,’ or whether it suffices that the act of
using a person to avoid detection be ‘knowing[] and intentional[].’”305 The
court seized what it saw as ambiguity to hold that a defendant need neither
be purposeful nor even knowing as to the age of the juvenile employed. The
holding was clearly based on policy concerns: the court said that to require
even knowledge would be to “invite blindness by drug dealers to the age of
youths they employ” and to ignore the special purpose of the statute to
“protect a vulnerable class defined by age.”306
The rule of lenity operated as little more than a speed bump on the Chin
court’s road to a strict liability reading of the statute. That is because lenity
applied only if the court could not infer the statute’s meaning. The Chin
court inferred that no mental state was required because it was “implausible
that Congress would have placed on the prosecution the often impossible
burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant knew the
youth he enticed was under eighteen.”307
301. Id. at 1276 n.2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(2) (2012)).
302. Id. at 1279 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(2)).
303. Id. at 1279–80 (citing United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737, 738–39 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Valencia-Roldan, 893 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carter, 854
F.2d 1102, 1108–09 (8th Cir. 1988)).
304. Id. at 1279.
305. Id. (alteration in original).
306. Id. at 1280.
307. Id. In a final flourish that is fairly typical of such opinions, the Chin court used the fact that
the crime of using a juvenile in the illegal drug trade was a separate crime from selling drugs as a reason
not to read in a knowledge requirement. Because the offense clearly required knowingly and
intentionally using another for the purpose of concealing a violation of federal narcotic laws, this was
not a case where interpreting the statute broadly “threatens to criminalize ‘apparently innocent
conduct.’” Id. This final move adds insult to injury. Purposely concealing an ongoing violation of federal
narcotics laws is already punishable under basic principles of complicity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAW 713 (5th ed. 2010) (“Generally, it may be said that accomplice liability exists when the
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Chin is noteworthy only because it is typical. Typical not only of how
courts handle ambiguous mens rea modification issues, but also, more
generally, of the way courts twist themselves into knots dealing with
unclear, or potentially unpopular, statutory language.
The confusion and unpredictability of the Court’s mens rea doctrines
establish the need for clear statement rules. Judges interpreting statutes
should not have to balance innocence against dangerousness, to decide what
types of danger mean that an offender is not acting innocently, or to choose
between competing ways of framing the behavior in question that make it
seem more or less innocent. Such choices are value-laden, subjective, and
yield unpredictable results. Therefore, those choices should be made by
legislators in clear and politically accountable ways.
But legislatures have failed to make such choices—or at least they have
failed to make such choices clear. Take, for example, the recent mens rea
reform efforts.308 A number of groups have been advocating for reforms to
mens rea in federal criminal law. In particular, they have advocated
adopting a statutory default mental state requirement, as well as a
requirement that a defendant knew that their behavior was illegal if the
statute criminalizes behavior that a reasonable person would not know was
prohibited.309 But, as Ben Levin has detailed, these reform efforts have faced
stiff opposition from those who want to ensure robust prosecution of
environmental and other regulatory crimes.310 As a result, federal crimes
continue to fail to specify a mental state. And political disagreement ensures
that the ambiguity in these statutes will endure.
Our clear statement rule not only repairs the damage done by the Court’s
mishandling of the public welfare doctrine, but it also removes ambiguity
as a tool for legislative compromise. A clear statement rule that requires
legislatures to clearly state if they intend to impose criminal liability for
defendants who acted without knowledge removes the need for the public
welfare doctrine. And it makes the stakes clear for legislatures—they cannot
omit mental states from statutes in the hope that courts will later interpret
statutes in a way that furthers their own agenda.

accomplice intentionally encourages or assists, in the sense that this purpose is to encourage or assist
another in the commission of a crime as to which the accomplice has the requisite mental state.”).
The Supreme Court has used similar reasoning in interpreting mandatory minimum sentencing
provisions. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 574–76 (2009). But see Flores-Figueroa v.
United States, 556 U.S. 646, 656–57 (2009).
308. E.g., Mens Rea Reform Act of 2018, S. 3118, 115th Cong. (2018).
309. Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
491, 509–12 (2019).
310. Id. at 523-27.
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Of course, it is not enough to say that there ought to be a clear statement
rule about mens rea; it is also necessary to state what that rule would be.
That is because, if there is to be a presumption against strict liability, courts
must supply a particular mental state when faced with statutes that omit a
mental state but do not include a clear statement in favor of strict liability.
Put differently, there must be a default mens rea standard that applies when
statutes are unclear. We believe that the default standard ought to be
“knowingly.”311
There are many reasons to adopt a clear statement rule that imposes a
default mens rea standard, and thus requires legislatures to speak clearly if
they intent to impose strict liability. First, such a rule is strongly supported
by history. The common law has always been hostile to strict liability.
Outside of statutory rape and a few other criminal offenses relating to the
protection of minors, strict liability did not exist in the common law of
crimes.312 Scienter—knowledge of wrongfulness—was required at common
law not just for criminal law but for many actions in tort and contract as
well. This hostility to stricter standards of liability made the passage to the
American colonies.313 The public welfare doctrine developed as an
exception to the general rule that all crimes required a truly culpable mental
state. The Model Penal Code went a step further and precluded strict
liability for all crimes.314
Second, requiring a clear statement for strict liability also finds support
in the Constitution’s protection of notice.315 Notice is a “core due process
concept[].”316 Courts have traced its protection in the Constitution to both
311. In selecting this standard, we are relying—as many do, in modern criminal law—on the mens
rea categories articulated in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1985). Those categories have been enormously influential in the years since the Model Penal Code was
written, as they brought rigor and precision to the concept of mens rea that had previously been lacking.
312. See LAFAVE, supra note 117, § 5.5 (“For several centuries (at least since 1600) the different
common law crimes have been so defined as to require, for guilt, that the defendant’s acts or omissions
be accompanied by one or more of the various types of fault (intertion, knowledge, recklessness or—
more rarely—negligence); a person is not guily of a common law crime without one of these kinds of
fault.”).
313. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept,
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was
congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states
codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts
assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent
was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.” (footnote omitted)).
314. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). The Model Penal Code recognized
the possibility of strict liability for mere infractions, an offense below the level of a misdemeanor and
an offense for which the penalty can only be a fine. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1985).
315. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1088 (2014).
316. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 459 (2001).
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the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses.317 Strict liability crimes fail to
give notice because they allow punishment based only on conduct, no matter
how blameless. Even a reasonable belief is not defense to a strict liability
standard. A defendant who was entirely unaware of material circumstances
could be punished under a strict liability standard—even if the defendant
had taken all reasonable precautions.318
Importantly, our clear statement rule is not simply aimed at strict
liability; it also sets a default mental state of “knowingly.” That is to say,
unless the legislature clearly says otherwise, prosecutors will have to
demonstrate that defendants acted knowingly—rather than merely
negligently or recklessly—with respect to each element of a crime or with
respect to aggravating factors.
For example, our proposed clear statement rule would have decided Chin
differently. Because Congress did not clearly state that it intended to impose
liability even if the defendant did not know the age of the person that he or
she employed in a drug transaction, courts would have no choice but to
interpret the statute to require the government to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew the person employed was under eighteen.
To be sure, our preferred default mental state does not have the same
historical pedigree as a clear statement rule against strict liability. Many
common law crimes, such as battery, are general intent crimes and require
only a general awareness of one’s conduct.319 One could easily translate this
general intent requirement into the modern mens rea category of
“recklessness”—that is, the conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk. This may explain why the Model Penal Code adopted a
default mens rea of recklessness for statutes that omitted a mental state.320
But, despite the weak historical foundation, we think that “knowing” is
the appropriate default standard for a mens rea clear statement rule. For one
thing, conscious disregard of a substantial risk is a somewhat convoluted
mental state to apply to non-result crimes. How does one recklessly assault
someone? Commit a burglary? Or steal property? For another, voters tend
to imagine the worst case scenario when evaluating criminal legislation and
criminal punishment.321 It is quite clear that people perceive crimes
317.
318.

See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439–40, 440 n.12 (1997).
See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 417 (1993); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12
STAN. L. REV. 731, 731–32 (1960).
319. E.g., LAFAVE, supra note 307, at 267–68, 861–63.
320. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
321. When asked about crime in the abstract, voters (and presumably legislators) imagine an
aggravated version of the crime. For example, when asked what the sentence for burglary ought to be,
voters falsely assume that burglars are commonly armed, that the average burglar has a longer criminal
record, and that a burglar is likely to inflict physical harm. These assumptions lead that voter to articulate
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committed knowingly to be more serious, and more deserving of
punishment, than crimes committed recklessly.322 Thus, knowledge (rather
than recklessness) likely better captures what both legislators and voters
imagine when they think about crime and criminals. Legislatures are free to
decide that the same penalties ought to apply to intentional and nonintentional behavior. But that decision should be made explicitly, and the
statutory text should clearly inform voters about the decision that their
representatives are making.
In sum, we set the default standard at knowing because knowledge is a
simpler mental state to apply and because we believe—in keeping with the
anti-punitive values underlying criminal clear statement rules—that the
default standard should err on the side of greater culpability rather than less.
We acknowledge that the choice of this particular default mental state may
be controversial. But, even if one thinks that recklessness is the appropriate
default mental state, as opposed to knowledge, that should not lessen the
force of our argument that courts should adopt a mens rea clear statement
rule.
B. Substantial Harm Clear Statement Rule
Our second proposed clear statement rule targets overly broad statutes.
Some statutes are written so broadly that they include both serious and
trivial conduct. We propose that courts adopt a clear statement rule that
excludes trivial conduct from felony liability absent a clear statement to the
contrary. Specifically, we propose a clear statement rule that requires a
defendant to have either caused or intended to cause substantial harm in
order for her conduct to fall within the scope of a felony statute. Such a clear
statement rule will force legislatures who wish to impose severe penalties
for trivial conduct to say so clearly.
Legislators (and their constituents) are willing to endure laws that
include innocent behavior or trivial wrongdoing because they do not expect
the laws to be fully enforced. They assume that law enforcement will use
these laws only to target serious offenders—an idea that Josh Bowers calls

a preference for a longer sentence. But the voter’s assumptions about the typical burglary are incorrect;
most burglars are unarmed, have shorter criminal histories, and are less likely to harm a victim than the
voter assumes. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE. L.J. 1775, 1781 (1999). Put differently, when deciding how and whether to
punish certain conduct, people tend to imagine the worst. See generally Kennedy, supra note 4.
322. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 94–97 (1995) (reporting results from empirical studies indicating that
people assign a higher degree of liability to knowing versus reckless conduct).
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“equitable discretion.”323 But most defendants have no recourse when
prosecutors fail to use their equitable discretion to prosecute only serious
offenders.324 So long as defendants’ behavior falls within the text of the
statute, prosecutors are free to charge and convict them.
Legislatures have many incentives to pass such overly broad statutes. It
is not just that precisely crafted laws require time and effort.325 Precise laws
also make it easier for wrongdoers to escape liability through a
“loophole.”326 And precise laws are more likely to be rendered obsolete by
technology or other changes in circumstances. Broadly written laws are less
likely to be circumvented or rendered obsolete. But they accomplish this by
criminalizing more conduct than is necessary to achieve the legislature’s
goal.327
Bond v. United States328 provides a helpful illustration. Bond involved a
prosecution under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act,
which was enacted to fulfill the United States’ treaty obligations.329 But the
statute defines “chemical weapon” very broadly.330 And so federal
323. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010). As Bowers explains, a prosecutor might decide not
to charge a person because she is unsure that she has enough evidence to prove guilt, because she wishes
to conserve resources for other cases, or because she decides that a particular defendant—though
guilty—is not sufficiently blameworthy. Id. at 1657. It is this last type of decision—“whether defendants
normatively ought to be charged”—that is an exercise of equitable discretion. Id. at 1658.
324. As noted below, defendants in some jurisdictions are able to seek a dismissal under
specialized statutes. See infra note 365 and accompanying text. And a small number of defendants have
succeeded in convincing judges to label facially clear statutes as ambiguous—so that they could render
a more narrow interpretation that excluded the defendants’ trivial conduct. See infra notes 342–344 and
accompanying text.
325. See supra note 36.
326. See Buell, supra note 37.
327. See Buell, supra note 37, at 1502–04 (providing an example of different iterations of a law
banning pitbulls and other dogs in order to address strategic behavior by those who train and own
aggressive and dangerous dogs).
328. 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
329. Id. at 848–49. The statute was enacted to implement the United Nations Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction. Id. at 844. The preamble of the Convention states that the “Parties to this Convention [are]
[d]etermined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete
disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination
of all types of weapons of mass destruction.” Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S.
TREATY DOC. No. 103-21 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
330. That statute forbids anyone from, inter alia, knowingly possessing or using “any chemical
weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012). It defines “chemical weapon” to include “toxic chemical[s]”
which it defines as
any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals,
regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are
produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere.
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prosecutors used the statute to convict Carol Anne Bond, who put two
caustic chemicals (one of which she ordered on Amazon) on the car door,
mailbox, and door knob of a woman who had an affair with her husband.331
Although the two chemicals could be lethal at high doses, it was undisputed
that Bond did not intend to kill her victim. “She instead hoped that [the
victim] would . . . develop an uncomfortable rash.”332 Even this did not
happen. Instead, the victim “suffered a minor chemical burn on her thumb,
which she treated by rinsing with water.”333 Yet Bond was convicted under
a statute that allowed a sentence of life imprisonment.
This is a clear case of an overly broad law. Although Bond’s behavior
fell within the text of the statute, it is highly unlikely that Congress was
thinking of defendants like Bond when it enacted the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act. Both the intended and actual injury in the
Bond case were less than one would suffer from being pepper sprayed—and
one can buy pepper spray at ordinary retailers, such as Walmart. No one
would say that Bond used a weapon of mass destruction; she targeted a
single individual, and her actions barely posed a threat to her particular
victim. Indeed, when Bond appealed her conviction, the Third Circuit
acknowledged that “[t]he Act’s breadth is certainly striking, seeing as it
turns each kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential
chemical weapons cache.” 334 But the court noted that “the Act’s wide net
was cast ‘for obvious reasons,’” and so it upheld the conviction.335 The
Supreme Court subsequently reversed on different grounds.336
Broadly written statutes are hardly an isolated occurrence. In the past
several years, the Supreme Court has heard several cases, including Bond,
in which they were forced to grapple with the government’s decision to use
broad laws to reach trivial behavior.337 For example, in Yates v. United
States,338 the government prosecuted a fisherman under 18 U.S.C. § 1519
for destroying or concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede”
an investigation of a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency
18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A), (8)(A). The statute specifically exempts “any individual self-defense device,
including those using a pepper spray or chemical mace.” 18 U.S.C. § 229C. It also exempts chemicals
that are intended for peaceful purposes, protective purposes, and unrelated military purposes. 18 U.S.C.
§ 229F(7).
331. Bond, 572 U.S. at 852.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 154 n.7 (3d. Cir 2012), rev’d sub nom. Bond v. United
States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
335. Id.
336. Bond, 572 U.S. at 866.
337. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Extremely Broad Laws, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3205783 (collecting cases).
338. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).

2019]

CRIMINAL CLEAR STATEMENT RULES

413

of the United States.339 Yates had caught some fish that were smaller than
what was permitted under applicable fishing regulations and he ordered a
crew member to dispose of the fish in order to prevent federal authorities
from confirming that he had violated these regulations.340 Violating the
regulations would have resulted in a fine.341 But section 1519—which was
adopted to address corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal—
carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.
The Court reversed the conviction in Yates. In order to do so, it had to
first find the statute ambiguous. As Justice Kagan illustrated in a biting
dissent, it is simply not credible for the Court to claim that the statute was
ambiguous—a fish is obviously a “tangible object.” 342 Yates is not the only
case where the courts have tried to deal with overly broad laws by claiming
that clear text was ambiguous.343 For example, the Supreme Court
overturned the conviction in Bond by claiming that the statutory language
was unclear.344
The modern embrace of textualism requires this sort of subterfuge. A
court that has eschewed the practice of interpreting statutes according to the
legislature’s purpose can hardly make judgements about whether a statute
is written more broadly than necessary—what is necessary can only be
determined by looking at what purpose the legislature was attempting to

339. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede,
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of
any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.”).
340. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1078.
341. Id. at 1079–80. The Court also noted that, in the time between the defendant’s actions and
the government’s indictment, the relevant fishing regulations had changed. Id.
342. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1090–1101 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
343. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 337 (manuscript at 2).
344. The chemicals that Bond used fell quite clearly within the statutory language. Bond v. United
States, 572 U.S. 844, 867–74 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Nonetheless, the defendant
in Bond ended up prevailing because the majority used a federalism presumption—requiring a “clear
indication” that Congress meant to “intrude[] on the police power of the States”—to read the statute
more narrowly. Id. at 857–58, 860 (majority opinion). Unfortunately, lower courts have not read Bond
to actually require a federalism clear statement when faced with other criminal statutes. E.g., United
States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Looney, 606 F. App’x 744, 747 (5th
Cir. 2015). And, even if courts were to faithfully apply this federalism clear statement rule to criminal
laws, the rule is limited to federal criminal law. The clear statement rule does not protect defendants
from overly broad state statutes. For example, Bond committed her crimes in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania makes it a first degree felony to possess, manufacture, or use a weapon of mass destruction,
and it defines “weapon of mass destruction” to include any “chemical element or compound which
causes death or bodily harm.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2716(i)(5) (2002). In other words, overly broad
statutes are not merely a federalism issue.
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achieve.345 As Yates, Bond, and similar cases illustrate,346 a statute that is
overly broad can nonetheless be written quite clearly. Thus, we need to
develop a rule that addresses overly broad laws based on their breadth.347
A clear statement rule requiring a defendant to have caused or intended
to cause substantial harm would do precisely that, and it would go a long
way to counteracting some of the worst problems associated with overly
broad statutes. In particular, such a clear statement rule would reduce the
risk that defendants are disproportionately punished for their acts.
Defendants would not have to rely on the equitable discretion of prosecutors
to avoid charges for trivial violations of a criminal statute. A clear statement
rule would ensure that each defendant charged with a serious crime could
argue that she ought not be convicted because her wrongful conduct was
trivial. That is because the clear statement rule, in effect, adds a new element
to all felony statutes: that the defendant either caused or intended to cause
substantial harm. Unless the statute includes clear language to the contrary,
the prosecutor must prove this substantial harm element beyond a
reasonable doubt.348 Prosecutors who know that they may have to prove
such an element to a jury will be less likely to file charges in trivial cases.349
A substantial harm clear statement rule would be more effective at
dealing with overcriminalization cases like Bond than current doctrine.
Textualism does not exclude Bond’s behavior from the statute because the
chemicals she used fell within the extraordinarily broad definition of
“chemical weapon”—that is, “any chemical” which “can cause death . . .
regardless of their origin or of their method of production.”350 (The two
chemicals that she used were essentially harmless as she employed them,
but they could be lethal at much higher doses.) The rule of lenity could not
help Bond because the statute does not seem to be ambiguous.351 The statute
345. Cf. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) (“[I]t is not, and cannot be, our practice
to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedy—
even assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something other than the text of the statute
itself.”).
346. E.g., Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (construing statutory language
“this title”—which referred to title 26 of the U.S. Code—to refer only to particular IRS proceedings in
order to avoid turning any non-compliance with IRS rules into a felony).
347. See generally Brennan-Marquez, supra note 337.
348. Cf. HUSAK, supra note 6, at 370–86 (discussing the prohibition on punishing de minimis
infractions of criminal law as both an element of an offense and a defense to conviction). That will
permit defendants both before trial—in the form of a motion to dismiss the indictment, e.g., FED. R.
CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v) (“failure to state an offense”)—and at trial to argue that she neither intended nor
caused substantial harm.
349. Those prosecutors who do elect to charge trivial conduct run the risk of losing at trial, which
gives them little leverage in plea bargaining.
350. 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) (2012).
351. To be sure, the Supreme Court stated that “the improbably broad reach of the key statutory
definition” created statutory “ambiguity.” Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 859–60 (2014). But the
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defined the term “chemical weapon,” and so it was not subject to a
vagueness challenge. The statute did not affect First Amendment activity,
and so it was not subject to an overbreadth challenge. Bond was not subject
to the death penalty nor was she a juvenile facing a life-without-parole
sentence, and so she could not challenge her punishment as excessive under
the Eighth Amendment.
To be sure, legislatures could satisfy a substantial harm clear statement
rule by stating that they intend a statute to apply to defendants no matter
how little harm they caused or intended to cause. Indeed, one might imagine
a world in which legislatures routinely included in statutes the phrase “a
person need not intend or cause substantial harm to violate this statute.” But
there are at least three reasons to believe that legislatures are unlikely to
include such statements, as a matter of course, in legislation combatting
serious crimes.
First, an affirmative statement that legislation ought to be used in trivial
situations undercuts any argument that the new statute is necessary to
address substantial harms. As explained above, new criminal laws are often
adopted when the threat of something or someone is greatly exaggerated.352
Statutory language extending liability to trivial conduct is inconsistent with
this moral panic narrative, and so the pressure to pass legislation will not
extend to including language about trivial conduct.
Our legislative dysfunction is driven, at least in part, by public opinion—
in particular a widely shared belief “that criminals are not receiving harsh
enough punishment.”353 But this punitive public opinion is a result of several
information deficits,354 including an information deficit about the common
characteristics of crimes. In particular, voters assume that the typical crime
is more serious than the average crime actually is. For example, one study
documented that voters supported harsher sentences for burglary because
they assumed that burglars are commonly armed and that a burglar is likely
to inflict physical harm. But these assumptions about the typical burglary
Court did not use the rule of lenity to resolve the case—instead, it used a clear statement rule. Id. That
suggests the Court did not believe that the statute was ambiguous enough for lenity to apply.
352. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
353. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6 (2010); see
also Bibas, supra note 44, at 927 (“In polls, the public says in the abstract that it thinks that judges
sentence too leniently.”); Loretta J. Stalans & Arthur J. Lurigio, Lay and Professionals’ Beliefs About
Crime and Criminal Sentencing: A Need for Theory, Perhaps Schema Theory, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
333, 344 (1990) (reporting that 72 percent of the lay subjects in the study said that judges are too lenient
in sentencing burglary).
354. Those information deficits include public misunderstanding about the crime rate and public
perception about sentence lengths. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Mandatory Minimums and Popular
Punitiveness, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 23, 24–27 (identifying these information deficits and
collecting sources).
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are incorrect; most burglars are unarmed and are unlikely to harm a
victim.355
If legislators were forced to explicitly state that they intended harsh
penalties to apply to defendants who neither intend nor cause serious harm,
then they would not be able to rely on public misperceptions about crime
characteristics. Take, for example, the Controlled Substances Act.356 The
text of that statute criminalizes, among other behaviors, a person giving a
prescription painkiller to her spouse who injures his back. Voters likely
assume that this criminal statute targets commercial drug dealers. An
explicit statement by the legislature that it intends to include trivial offenses
would counterbalance the information deficit. It would tell voters that the
harsh penalties would apply to less culpable defendants, rather than
allowing voters to assume that the harsh penalties are needed to deal with
more serious offenders.
Second, such a statement would mean that legislators could not blame
prosecutors for prosecutions of trivial conduct. As we noted above,
legislators can escape accountability for overly broad laws by blaming
prosecutors for cases involving trivial conduct.357 But if legislators include
language that explicitly includes trivial conduct within the scope of the
statute, they cannot say that trivial cases are the result of a failure of
prosecutorial discretion.
Third, such language would make it easier for opponents of the
legislation to challenge the legislation. That is, if legislatures explicitly state
that they are targeting trivial or insubstantial conduct for felony liability,
then they may lose political support for their punitive policies. The idea that
trivial violations of the law ought not be punished is deeply intuitive, and
likely widely shared.358 If legislatures were to start explicitly targeting
behavior that they were required to affirmatively label as “trivial” or “not
substantial,” it is difficult to believe that they will face no pushback on such
legislation. That pushback would likely result in a legislative compromise
that made no mention of the amount of harm required to trigger the
statute.359 And, if the statute did not explicitly include trivial harm, then the
clear statement rule would require a more narrow interpretation so that the
statute included only substantial harm.
355. Lanni, supra note 321, at 1781–82.
356. See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2012) (prohibiting the use of Schedule II drugs without a
prescription).
357. See Stuntz, supra note 50 and accompanying text.
358. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 362–89.
359. Ambiguity is a common method for obtaining legislative compromise. See generally Joseph
A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity
in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002).
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There is historical support for our substantial harm clear statement rule.
A requirement of substantial harm has deep roots in the common law maxim
de minimis non curat lex, which translates roughly to “the law does not
concern itself with trifles.”360 The maxim can be traced back to Roman
law,361 and it appears in the major English and early American treatises.362
It applies not only in civil cases, but also in criminal cases,363 though with
some limitations.364 And its influence can be seen today: approximately a
third of states, as well as the Model Penal Code, have codified the ability of
judges to dismiss criminal cases involving trivial wrongdoing.365
Fittingly, de minimis non curat lex was often used as a rule of statutory
construction.366 The maxim was most often used in civil cases. But it was
also used to dismiss prosecutions against criminal defendants whose
wrongdoing was minimal. For example, in State v. Goode, the North
Carolina Supreme Court vacated an accessory’s conviction for receiving
stolen goods after the fact.367 The defendant had received goods of little
value, and the punishment for the principals had been minimal, and so the
court relied on an old English case and the maxim de minimis non curat lex
to vacate the conviction.368
Similarly, in Rex v. Tindall,369 the defendants were indicted for creating
a nuisance in a harbor by building a structure to protect their shipyard.
Although building the structure fell within the text of the relevant statute,
the jury rendered a special verdict in which it noted that the structure had

360. De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Anna
Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 334–35 (2017); Max L. Veech & Charles R. Moon,
De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. REV. 537, 538 (1947) (noting that the maxim has also been
translated as “the law doth not regard trifles,” and arguing that this is the better translation).
361. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 258 n.1 (1966); Veech & Moon,
supra note 360, at 538.
362. Veech & Moon, supra note 360, at 537, 539, 542–43.
363. United States v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 194 F. 234, 250 (N.D. Ohio 1911) (“Criminal law,
as well as civil, honors the maxim, ‘De minimis non curat lex,’ which has controlling application to the
enforcement of a statute which aims at the repression of real and substantial abuses . . . .”); see also 1
BISHOP, supra note 211, § 320 (labeling it “an old and familiar maxim, which, standing in the foremost
rank of legal maxims, controls every department of our jurisprudence, civil and criminal”); Veech &
Moon, supra note 360, at 542 (describing the maxim as “a rule of reason, a substantive rule that may be
applied in all courts and to all types of issues” (footnote omitted)).
364. 1 BISHOP, supra note 211, §§ 320–21 (noting limitations on the doctrine in cases involving
larceny and arson).
365. Roberts, supra note 360, at 332–37 (collecting and categorizing the relevant statutes and
court rules).
366. Veech & Moon, supra note 360, at 542.
367. State v. Goode, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 463, 466 (1821).
368. Id. at 464–66. In particular, the Goode Court relied on the case of Abraham Evans, which is
discussed in MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW 73–74 (3d ed. 1792).
369. Rex v. Tindall (1837) 112 Eng. Rep. 55, 58; 6 Ad. & E. 143, 152.
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only a small effect on the rest of the harbor.370 The appellate court directed
that a verdict of not guilty be entered against the shipyard owners because
“no person can be made criminally responsible for consequences so slight,
and uncertain, and rare.”371
There is also modern precedent for our substantial harm rule. As Anna
Roberts has documented, nineteen states have “given trial courts the power
to dismiss prosecutions for the sake of justice.”372 Some states style this
power as the power to dismiss “in furtherance of justice,” while others
characterize it as the power to dismiss de minimis prosecutions.373
Regardless of how it is phrased, these statutes permit judges to dismiss
charges when the offense is insufficiently serious or did not cause sufficient
harm. A de minimis provision also appears in the Model Penal Code.374
Although these statutes have not received much attention,375 they appear to
be uncontroversial. That may be because they are seen as a necessary safety
valve to mitigate the excesses of the criminal justice system,376 or because
we share the intuition that we should not impose the heavy costs association
with a criminal conviction on those whose conduct is not seriously
wrongful.377 It is precisely for these reasons—because the criminal justice
system is too harsh and because it is unjust to punish trivial conduct—that
courts should adopt the substantial harm clear statement rule.
Some might object that our rule does not give any criteria for deciding
what actual or intended harm is substantial and what is not. Whether harm
was sufficiently serious will require a case-by-case determination based on
individual facts. But the need for case-by-case determinations without
clearly articulated criteria is hardly unique to our proposed rule. The law is
370. Id. at 57.
371. Id. at 58.
372. Roberts, supra note 360, at 330.
373. Id.
374. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“The Court shall dismiss a prosecution
if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the
attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant’s conduct . . . did not actually cause or threaten the
harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial
to warrant the condemnation of conviction . . . .”).
375. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 362 (noting how little attention these laws have received); see
also Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the “De Minimis” Defense, 1997
BYU L. REV. 51, 51–52; Roberts, supra note 360, at 330; Melissa Beth Valentine, Defense Categories
and the (Category-Defying) De Minimis Defense, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 545, 545–46 (2017).
376. See Roberts, supra note 360, at 339–46 (discussing how these provisions push back against
the size and the harshness of the criminal justice system).
377. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 365 (stating that the statutes which are “literally over-inclusive,
prohibiting a range of conduct broader than that which causes the harm or evil sought to be prevented,”
can “create a powerful case for exculpation,” and that when a “defendant’s conduct did cause the harm
or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, but did so” to a trivial extent, then liability
“would be unjust, even though persons may disagree about exactly what is unjust about it”).
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replete with statutes requiring factfinders to make qualitative determinations
about a defendant’s conduct or the consequences of that conduct.378 Asking
a jury to decide whether harm is substantial is no different than asking them
to determine whether something is reasonable or material.379 And, while
flexible standards in the criminal law can create their own problems,380 a
flexible standard is better than an obviously over-inclusive rule when it
comes to criminal liability.381
In any event, as a practical matter, our current system already relies
heavily on determinations such as whether a defendant caused or intended
to cause substantial harm. Prosecutors routinely make those determinations
in deciding whether to use their equitable discretion not to prosecute. Our
clear statement rule just reassigns those determinations to juries. If decisions
not to enforce the law are going to be made on a case-by-case basis, juries
ought to be making those decisions. Our constitutional structure inserts the
jury as an additional check on the punitive tendencies of government
actors.382 Asking juries to exercise the equitable discretion currently
exercised by prosecutors will likely result in criminal prosecutions that more
accurately reflect community norms about appropriate conduct.383 And it
would give a legitimate outlet for jurors to reject prosecutorial choices other
than through nullification.
Some might object that juries would make these decisions arbitrarily.
After all, jurors do not need to explain why they decided not to convict a
378. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 1a–99a, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
2551 (2015) (No. 13-7120) (collecting federal criminal statutes and state criminal statutes that employ
qualitative standards).
379. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995).
380. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 992–1022; Hessick, supra note 15, at 1158–60.
381. One might think that, as a general matter, rules are preferable to standards when it comes to
the imposition of criminal liability. That is because a system of rules makes clear the threshold for
liability before an individual acts, while standards only clarify the matter after the individual acts through
adjudication. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
560 (1992) (observing that “the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts
to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”). In other words, rules provide
more notice than standards, and notice is a bedrock principle of criminal justice. See Paul H. Robinson,
Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 347–48 (2005). But
that analysis holds true only insofar as the rule sets both the actual threshold for liability. Because overly
broad laws are not always enforced as written, they give less notice than other bright-line rules. Cf.
Hessick, supra note 1, at 998–99 (explaining how overly broad laws fail to give notice).
382. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–07 (2004).
383. In this respect, the proposed clear statement rule is similar to various proposals aimed at
incorporating more community input into the modern criminal justice system. See, e.g., Laura I.
Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 741–48 (2010); Joshua Kleinfeld et. al., White Paper of
Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2017); Lanni, supra note 321; Richard
E. Myers II, Requiring A Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 146–51 (2009); Jocelyn
Simonson, Essay, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 286–
96 (2019).
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defendant, and they need not be consistent across cases because they sit only
one case at a time. But that is not very different from the status quo:
prosecutors are under no obligation to explain their decisions not to
prosecute, and they are under no obligation to decline to enforce cases in a
consistent fashion.384
What is more, giving this power to juries does not completely remove it
from prosecutors. Prosecutors will still have the power to decline to
prosecute, and whether the defendant caused or intended to cause sufficient
harm will continue to be one factor they consider. The proposed clear
statement rule would only limit the power of prosecutors to bring charges
in the absence of substantial harm. And it would install the jury as a new
check on the prosecutor’s judgment whether the harm or intended harm in
a particular case was significant enough to warrant a felony conviction.385
In this way, the substantial harm clear statement rule provides substantially
more protection of individual liberty than our current system of relying on
prosecutorial discretion.386
In sum, a substantial harm clear statement rule would mitigate one of the
worst consequences of overly broad laws—the arbitrary and
disproportionate punishment of trivial conduct. Such a rule is grounded in
both history and modern practice. And, even if such a clear statement rule
results in legislatures routinely enacting laws that include trivial conduct, at
least it would require legislators to bear the political costs of imposing harsh
penalties on those whose actions were not particularly harmful.
CONCLUSION
Clear statement rules are not a panacea for all that ails criminal justice.
They are unlikely to have more than indirect effects on issues surrounding
policing or racial inequality. Nor will they solve all of the legislative
dysfunction that we and other observers have described. It is possible that a
determinedly punitive legislature would amend its statutes to clearly
describe the sweeping and harsh criminal liability that characterizes the
status quo. To do so, however, they would have to take responsibility for
their punitive choices. Clear statement rules will also not put an end to
demagogic criticisms of “activist” judges. Judges who choose to adopt
criminal clear statement rules are likely to face some scrutiny—especially
when they adopt the rule for the first time.
384. See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 78
(2011).
385. Cf. Myers, supra note 383.
386. See Bowers, supra note 323, at 1704–23 (describing the “systemic pressures and institutional
constraints” which cause prosecutors to “undervalue—or, at least, insufficiently act upon—equitable
reasons for charge declination”).
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But clear statement rules are likely to be less controversial and more
effective than the current doctrinal tools that courts use to intervene in
substantive criminal law. And therefore, they are a promising path to at least
some reduction in the harms caused by legislative dysfunction.
Perhaps the greatest virtue of criminal clear statement rules is the
simplicity of their rationale. “Say what you mean, and mean what you say”
is a clear, sharp message that just might cut—or at least fray—the Gordian
knot of contemporary legislative dysfunction about crime.

